Empty shell no more: China’s growing footprint in Central and Eastern Europe by Andrijauskas, Konstantinas et al.
Empty shell no more:  
China’s growing footprint in  
Central and Eastern Europe
P O LI CY PAPE R
IVANA KARÁSKOVÁ, ALICJA BACHULSKA,  
ÁGNES SZUNOMÁR, STEFAN VLADISAVLJEV,  
UNA ALEKSANDRA BĒRZIŅA-ČERENKOVA, 
KONSTANTINAS ANDRIJAUSKAS, LIISI KARINDI, 
ANDREEA LEONTE, NINA PEJIĆ, FILIP ŠEBOK

Empty shell no more:  
China’s growing footprint in  
Central and Eastern Europe
P O LI CY PAPE R
IVANA KARÁSKOVÁ, ALICJA BACHULSKA, ÁGNES SZUNOMÁR, STEFAN VLADISAVLJEV,  
UNA ALEKSANDRA BĒRZIŅA-ČERENKOVA, KONSTANTINAS ANDRIJAUSKAS, LIISI KARINDI, 
ANDREEA LEONTE, NINA PEJIĆ, FILIP ŠEBOK
EMPTY SHELL NO MORE: CHINA’S GROWING FOOTPRINT  
IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
Policy paper
April 2020
Editor – Ivana Karásková
Authors – Konstantinas Andrijauskas, Alicja Bachulska, Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova,  
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Summary
 → The 17+1 platform has been 
labeled as an ‘empty shell’ with 
the assertion that cooperation 
between Central and Eastern 
Europe with China lacks 
substance. A large-scale audit 
of relations, however, points 
to a more complex scenario. 
Relations between China and 
Central and Eastern Europe are 
growing, encompassing political, 
economic and societal domains 
and are loaded with action.
 → The fragmented nature of 
the information complicates 
understanding of the real nature 
of 17+1, as in individual states 
China’s actions seem scarce 
and random. Also the areas 
of interaction are treated as 
separate. It is only when the 
whole picture is analyzed that 
the progress and direction of the 
17+1 platform become evident.
 → In the past eight years, China 
has managed to build a system 
of interconnected relations in 
Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE), where it was almost 
absent before. Paradoxically, 
China has contributed to 
the conceptualization and 
institutionalization of CEE as 
a region.
 → Resembling a version of 
US alliances in East Asia, 
the 17+1 framework can be 
characterized by a hub and 
spokes logic of cooperation 
with China taking the lead in 
‘multilateral bilateralism’.
 → Despite its efforts, China has not 
transplanted its foreign policy 
concepts into the language 
of cooperation with Central 
and Eastern Europe. On the 
contrary, the CEE countries 
have successfully shaped the 
diplomatic language to stay 
in accordance with the EU 
framework. 17+1 cooperation 
has almost universally led to 
the growth of high-level political 
contacts between the CEE 
countries and China. However, 
the development of bilateral 
relationships happens on separate 
trajectories. It is the activity and 
decisions taken by the individual 
17 CEE countries rather than the 
format itself which shape the level 
of engagement.
 → While Hungary and Serbia have 
supported China on political 
issues, they represent an 
exception rather than the rule. The 
assumptions that CEE as a whole 
has become more forthcoming 
towards China on political issues 
is not supported by the evidence.
 → China has used the CEE as 
a testing ground for more activist 
party diplomacy led by the 
Chinese Communist Party.  
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China cultivates relationships with 
important political elites to assure 
a long-term pro-China inclination 
in the respective countries.
 → China has unsuccessfully tried 
to assuage the EU’s concerns 
about using the format to divide 
Europe. The US-China rivalry has 
become a factor in CEE relations 
with China, with several countries 
afraid of endangering their 
traditional ties with Washington. 
China has tried to walk a fine line 
in its approach towards Russia in 
CEE.
 → Economic cooperation in 17+1 is 
mainly driven by China as it sets 
the agenda.
 → China’s economic impact on 
CEE countries is still small. CEE 
countries are highly dependent 
on both trade and investment 
relations with developed, mainly 
EU member states, while China 
represents a minor yet increasing 
share. The CEE region is also 
far from being among the most 
important partners for China.
 → Despite the 17+1 format, China 
still handles its economic affairs 
on a bilateral basis. Relations 
with the countries of the Visegrád 
region and Serbia are of particular 
importance, while relations with 
other CEE countries lag behind.
 → Trade relations remain relatively 
limited and unbalanced, leading 
to an increased trade deficit in all 
17 CEE countries with China. 
 → Chinese FDI are modest and 
concentrated in a few countries 
(Hungary, Czechia and Poland) 
with almost no opportunity for 
other countries to receive sizable 
amounts of investment. Although 
financial cooperation has gained 
momentum, it is limited to EU 
member states. 
 → Tourism is the real success story of 
economic cooperation within the 
framework, since CEE countries 
have achieved higher visibility in 
China (while a general increase 
in the amount of Chinese middle 
class travelers may also play 
a role). 
 → Given the character of the 
Chinese system and the high level 
of penetration of Chinese society 
by the state, people-to-people 
contacts actually mean Chinese 
government-to-people in relations 
with CEE countries.
 → The number of Confucius Institutes 
has increased in CEE countries. 
Youth cooperation is also on the 
rise, with increased numbers of 
Chinese government scholarships 
issued to CEE students.
 → Politically motivated programs 
targeting youth and political 
leaders, such as Bridge for the 
Future, China-CEE Young Political 
Leaders Forum and Political 
Parties Dialogue, go largely 
unnoticed in all 17 CEE countries.
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Recommendations
 → The 17+1 format should not be 
discarded. The simplistic view of 
Europe being divided by China 
through 17+1 should be opposed as 
it infantilizes the CEE states and 
denies CEE countries their agency. 
17 CEE countries should adopt 
the ACT strategy proposed in this 
paper in their dealings with China.
 → The EU needs to continue 
including CEE EU members in 
efforts to shape a common EU 
policy towards China that should 
represent the interests of all 
member states.
 → The EU should open a clear path to 
membership to the Western Balkan 
countries to offset the growth of 
China’s political influence. The 
EU must play a more active role 
in the Western Balkan’s economic 
development.
 → The 17 countries should improve 
their communication and 
coordination in feasible areas to 
shift the 17+1 into a multilateral 
forum serving primarily their 
interests. 
 → More attention should be given 
to the sub-national (regional, 
provincial, etc.) dimension of 
China-CEE cooperation that has 
largely developed under the radar. 
CEE states should pay attention to 
the potential politicization of such 
cooperation and China’s efforts 
to take advantage of the lower 
profile of local contacts to avoid 
attention. 
 → The increased prominence of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
in China’s approach towards the 
CEE warrants vigilance. There 
should be greater scrutiny by the 
civil society and media towards 
nontransparent dealings between 
the local parties and the CCP. 
 → In order to benefit more from 
economic cooperation with China, 
CEE countries should act together. 
Regular 17+0 consultation meetings 
should precede summits.
 → The major challenges of trade 
relations, such as trade deficit, 
cannot be overcome by single 
country solutions; CEE countries 
should follow the EU’s strategic 
aims in trade policy.
 → Coordinated rules should be 
established relating to investment 
screening also in non-EU member 
states. 
 → Independent, fact-based media 
coverage is needed in order to 
achieve greater transparency and 
understanding of mechanisms 
behind societal cooperation 
between China and CEE countries. 
 → More public (on EU, state, or 
regional levels) as well as private 
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financial support for academic 
institutions researching China 
is needed in order to avoid 
a situation where Confucius 
Institutes and other PRC-related 
institutions become the most 
influential actors producing and 
disseminating knowledge about 
Chinese politics, society and 
culture. 
 → China watchers should exchange 
knowledge and experiences across 
Europe and with other parts of the 
world in order to detect potential 
threats to democratic standards 
governing the societal level of 
cooperation with Chinese actors 
outside of the PRC. 
 → It remains crucial not to equate 
all forms of societal cooperation 
with China with potential threats. 
The focus should be on achieving 
transparency.
 → CEE countries should be aware of 
the risks associated with a growing 
skepticism towards China turning 
into racist attitudes against the 
Chinese diaspora, students and 
tourists. In order to avoid the 
rise of Sinophobia in CEE, clear 
divisions should be drawn between 
public criticism of government or 
party-led activities and Chinese 
nationals and their presence in the 
region.
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Engaging China in 17+1:  
Outline of ACT strategy
Ivana Karásková
The 17+1 platform1 has been labeled by some as China’s tool to divide and conquer 
Europe.2 At the same time, analysts (the author included) frequently dismissed these 
charges, arguing that 17+1 is an ‘empty shell’ and cooperation between Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) and China lacks substance.3 The divide in understanding of 
the platform became apparent when China announced the upgrading of the annual 
17+1 summit which was expected to be held in Beijing in April 2020 from the level 
of prime ministers to the level of heads of state. The first camp of analysts perceived 
it as a worrisome trend, while the latter argued that it is mostly the prime ministers, 
not the presidents, who call the shots in Central and Eastern European politics. Thus 
the upgrade, they argued, was only symbolic.4
The proponents of the ‘empty shell’ concept, however, seem to be wrong. A large-
scale audit of relations between China and the 17 Central and Eastern European 
countries points to a more alarming scenario. Substance in relations with China is, 
indeed, not lacking, and cooperation between China and Central and Eastern Europe 
flourishes, encompassing political, economic and societal dimensions, and is loaded 
with action.
The reason why observers missed these developments is two-fold. First, the in-
formation is fragmented. In individual Central and Eastern European states, China’s 
actions look scarce and random. 17+1 is neither a multilateral forum, nor a bilateral one. 
It is an exercise of ‘multilateral bilateralism’5, resembling the hub and spoke system 
of relations, with China acting as a hub in the middle. The spokes, i.e. the Central and 
Eastern European countries, exhibit – to their detriment – limited if any cooperation 
among themselves. Second, the areas of interaction, be they political, economic or 
societal, have been treated as separate. However, 17+1 is not only a political platform, 
it breaches politics and enters into domains of economy, youth cooperation, academic 
exchanges, sport, health or media cooperation. Only when the whole picture is ana-
lyzed, does the progress and direction of the 17+1 platform become evident.
Over the past eight years, since the inception of 17+1 in 2012, China has ma-
naged to build a system of interconnected relations in CEE, a region where it had 
been almost absent before. For the foreseeable future, China will continue to rise in 
power and importance. Its increasing global presence, already taken for granted, will 
inevitably stimulate its willingness to seek influence through different organizational 
and institutional settings, including (sub)regional organizations. Given the fact that 
China finds it extremely difficult to ‘infiltrate’ the long-existing ones, it will attempt 
to multiply the groupings of its own founding, and will try to extract as much as 
possible from those already in existence, such as 17+1.
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The fears of Chinese incursions on many levels (technological, economic, poli-
tical, or even military) are, factoring in specific regional contexts, substantiated and 
the dangers are real. However, a response to the threat of expanding Chinese influ-
ence in the form of shutting Beijing out is, in practical terms, impossible – not least 
because it would probably provoke more extreme reactions from the PRC. Instead, 
a three-pronged ACT (adapt > counter > target) strategy, modeled on the realities of 
the 17+1 initiative, is suggested.
While seemingly obvious, adapting to China’s presence in the region (be it in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, or elsewhere) may in fact be the hardest component and the 
most difficult to pull off correctly. China as an actor and an issue will continue to be 
a stable and growing, if often irritating, component of various regional constellations. 
Accepting this fact should not be confused with resignation and much less submission 
to China’s strategic interests. Quite the contrary: national and international strategies 
need to assess the existing and potential scope of China’s presence, define priorities 
as well as risks stemming from this phenomenon, and implement or address them 
through subsequent policies.
Groupings like 17+1 were clearly born out of China’s intention to create institu-
tional tools for amplifying its message and increasing its influence. Still, their members 
can conceivably utilize them as platforms for countering, limiting or even curbing 
China’s heft. The way forward consists in making full use of these organizations’ mul-
tilateral settings. While countries like Czechia, Estonia or Greece may find it difficult 
to face Chinese actions alone, there is no formal impediment against them bonding 
together and presenting their Chinese partners with a unified position. If China wants 
to retain its presence through these institutions, it is more likely (if grudgingly) to 
accept the ‘multilateral condition’ than to risk losing its influence altogether.
Once the members of regional platforms like 17+1 rediscover the multiplication 
effects inherent in ‘effective multilateralism’, to borrow a phrase from the 2003 
European Security Strategy, they could even turn these platforms into offensive 
instruments for targeting China with their specific demands. These might include 
widely controversial topics (from the Chinese perspective), such as limits imposed 
on Chinese technological companies or concerns with unfair trade practices, but also 
more cooperative issues like the need for properly regulating Chinese investment 
and improving market access for CEE countries’ products. While the actions of EU 
member states need to be in line with the agreed position on China within the EU, 
the CEE EU member states can utilize the 17+1 to achieve a better standing in nego-
tiations not only vis-à-vis China, but also within the EU. The Western Balkans nat-
urally pivot towards the European Union, despite the unfortunate lack of a credible 
and clear enlargement roadmap at the time of writing the publication. The EU should 
then open a clear path to membership to the Western Balkan countries to offset the 
growth of China’s political influence.
The current debate seems transfixed by the image of China as an omnipotent, 
 ever-present and inescapable threat. China is – and will remain – far from it. Even small 
states, especially those safely separated from the immediate effects of China’s economic, 
political and military might, can succeed in promoting their own interests to their 
dealings with the PRC. The ACT strategy provides a general outline for achieving 
this objective.
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The following chapters analyze relations between China and 17 Central and 
Eastern European countries (CEECs) in three separate areas – political, economic 
and societal, documenting China’s increasing footprint in the region. The publication 
represents the first attempt to systematically audit China-CEE relations. Given the 
scope of the endeavor and a lack of information in several areas or specific countries, 
the publication does not claim to tackle each and every form of cooperation. Still, it 
attempts to uncover and analyze patterns pertaining to the region as a whole. 
Ten China experts from Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Serbia, Slovenia, Slovakia and Romania provided their input via a novel and unique 
collaborative platform, China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe (CHOICE), 
in order to reach realistic and achievable suggestions for a joint action plan of CEE 
countries within the outlined ACT strategy.
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1. Political relations: 
Beyond proclamations
Stefan Vladisavljev, Konstantinas Andrijauskas and Filip Šebok
During the past eight years, political cooperation between China and CEE through 
the 17+1 platform has developed beyond mere meetings of heads of governments 
(annual summits). It now encompasses cooperation between the Chinese Commu-
nist Party (CCP) and political parties from the region, as well as cooperation on the 
sub-governmental or sub-national (provincial, regional, etc.) levels. Given that 12 of 
the 17 European countries gathered in 17+1 are also EU members, political cooperation 
with China has the potential to influence the internal decision-making and external 
actions of the EU in regards to China.
Since 2012 the main framework for cooperation between China and CEECs has 
been the 17+1 platform. The profiles of European countries that are included in the 
platform are different – it encompasses Baltic countries, Balkan countries and Viseg-
rád Four (V4) countries. Some of them are EU members, some of them are NATO 
members, some of the countries remain EU candidate countries or are in the middle 
of their negotiations with the EU.
The 17+1 as a platform of cooperation slightly predates the most notable Chinese 
foreign policy mega-project – the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI, previously named the 
One Belt One Road initiative), which was launched by Chinese president Xi Jinping in 
2013. Even though 17+1 predates the BRI, after its launch 17+1 has become an integral 
part of the wider, global BRI project. The BRI is designed to increase connectivity 
through improvement of infrastructure development6 that would make China one 
of the most ubiquitous global powers worldwide with its numerous financial agree-
ments and construction projects all around the world, including Europe, where CEE 
represents a geographical gateway to the rest of the continent. Through both the 
17+1 and the BRI, China has ensured that the CEECs are willing to upgrade economic 
and thus also political relations with it.
Ever since the format’s inaugural Warsaw 2012 summit, its most important mani-
festation has been the China-CEECs meeting of heads of governments conducted 
annually in one of the participating countries in order to review cooperation achieve-
ments and set the direction for the future, thus performing dual decision-making and 
coordinating functions. As of the beginning of 2020, there have been 8 such summits 
thus far (see below) that have taken place in every major CEECs sub-region (two in 
the V4, four in the Balkans and one in the Baltic countries) and in China (Suzhou 
2015) itself. The 2019 inclusion of Greece allows one to expect a forthcoming summit 
there, although the 2020 one will be hosted by the Chinese capital, Beijing.
While the largest share of attention has been focused on the high-level summits, 
the 17+1 has grown to encompass a vast number of different cooperation formats, 
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Finland
Kosovo
Moldova
Ukraine
Belarus
Russia
Turkey
Italy
Austria
Germany
Denmark
Sweden
Norway
Netherlands
Belgium
Luxembourg
Switzerland
France
EU 17+1 members
Members of the 17+1 format
Non-EU 17+1 members EU member states Non-EU member states
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Poland
Slovakia
Hungary
Croatia
Serbia
Bulgaria
Greece
Romania
Montenegro
Albania
Slovenia
Macedonia
Czech 
Republic 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
MAP 1: CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF THE 17+1 PLATFORM
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ranging from ministerial dialogues to seminars and even dance camps. Moreover, 
as the platform has progressed through the years, China has encouraged the CEECs 
to take the lead in particular cooperation areas usually commensurate with their 
comparative advantages or at least ambitions by hosting the inaugural events and/or 
establishing relevant institutional structures, variously defined as 17+1 associations, 
secretariats, centers, etc.
The various cooperation structures differ significantly in terms of their charac-
ter and functioning. While sectoral leadership in a certain area seems to have been 
utilized by some CEE countries as an opportunity to pursue their priority agendas 
(usually bilateral vis-à-vis China rather than multilateral) with the useful cover, in 
other cases, it appears purely symbolic. For example the China-CEECs Technology 
Transfer Center in Slovakia is only a dormant website rather than a fully-fledged 
institution as its name might suggest.
Not only in terms of membership but also institutionally the platform is a rather 
loose grouping of states. The multilateral aspect of the format largely resembles that 
of a hub and spokes model, with China in the center but no connections between 
the individual CEE countries. The principal formalized administrative vehicle of the 
format is the Secretariat. This institution, announced during the inaugural summit and 
established the following year under China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), deals 
with communication and coordination on matters related to cooperation, preparation 
for meetings and implementation of relevant outcomes. The Secretariat consists of 
24 institutions representing China’s most important ministries and agencies active 
in the country’s foreign relations, while its administrative leadership comes out of 
the MFA higher ranks, particularly from its Department of European Affairs. China 
also appointed a special representative for China-CEE cooperation in 2015.
From the other side, every CEE country designated a counterpart department 
within their institutional structure and chose national coordinators to take part in 
work with the Secretariat and to promote the cooperation format in general. National 
coordinators have been meeting bi-annually with the Secretariat since 2013, with 
quarterly meetings with the CEECs’ embassies instituted in 2015. This points to 
a gradual deepening of the involvement of CEE countries in the process of coordina-
tion and agenda-setting, although it is China that remains the one running the show.
So far, the following 17+1 summit meetings have been conducted: the inaugural 
summit in Warsaw 2012 (Poland), Bucharest 2013 (Romania), Belgrade 2014 (Serbia), 
Suzhou 2015 (China), Riga 2016 (Latvia), Budapest 2017 (Hungary), Sofia 2018 (Bulgaria) 
and Dubrovnik 2019 (Croatia). Whereas Warsaw was still more of an ad hoc meeting, the 
following summit in Bucharest manifested China’s institutionalization of the format.7 
The most important outcomes produced by these events have been provided in a series 
of concluding statements, namely China’s 12 Measures for Promoting Friendly Co-
operation with CEECs which came out of the format’s inaugural 2012 Warsaw summit8, 
and the joint guidelines which have come out at the end of all of the subsequent meetings. 
While the 12 measures were proposed by China unilaterally without prior consulta-
tion with the CEE countries, the guidelines have been a result of joint consultations, 
with the EU also involved in the process. Although China still plays a central role 
in proposing the guidelines, they have actually been, quite surprisingly, little influ-
enced by typical Chinese diplomatic language – a brief look at the language of the 
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analogous China-led format for Africa (FOCAC) points to a striking difference.9 On 
the contrary, the guidelines have stressed complementarity and respect for the EU 
rules and principles (as a result of the insistence of some EU member states) and also 
reflected some of the misgivings of the CEE countries (such as access to the Chinese 
market and the need for a “more focused, results oriented approach” of the format). 
This shows greater agency on the part of CEE countries than is often assumed.
The comparatively brief 12 measures set the stage for cooperation, by outlining 
China’s plans for the format’s above-described institutional mechanism and general 
pledges to deepen cooperation in widely diverse economic (trade, investment, financial 
services), infrastructural (transportation), technological (high-tech, green economy) 
and people-to-people areas (culture, education, academic exchange).
The 2013 Bucharest guidelines, being the first such, provided the structural frame-
work on which all of the following ones would largely be based. These joint statements 
first commend the strengthening of China-CEECs cooperation in general and stress 
that it is in concord with the China-EU comprehensive strategic partnership and 
relevant national legislation and regulations (including the EU’s where those apply), 
designate a pompously defined theme of the meeting, then outline a list of the actual 
guidelines for cooperation, and finally present the annex on the implementation of 
the previously agreed-upon measures.
As was to be expected, the issue areas (along with the actual space dedicated to 
them in the guidelines) expanded with every summit conducted, but also increasingly 
propelled the agenda beyond the framework itself. Curiously, although the famed 
catchphrase of “connectivity” appeared in the first 2013 Bucharest Guidelines, agreed 
upon soon after the official proclamation of the BRI by China, the mega-project has 
been explicitly addressed only since the 2016 Riga Guidelines that emphasized pre-
cisely infrastructure and logistics. The 2017 Budapest Guidelines briefly mentioned 
the “instabilities and uncertainties of the world”, while the 2018 Sofia ones inserted 
the EU-inspired vocabulary about the need to establish a “level playing field” in the 
economic relationship between China and CEECs. The latest Dubrovnik 2019 summit 
has produced the largest change in the cooperation framework thus far due to the 
accession of Greece.
The annual summits have been most politically important for the hosting coun-
tries, as the Chinese PM’s attendance has been coupled with bilateral visits offering an 
opportunity to close high-profile deals. Conversely, apart from the largely ceremonial 
multilateral aspects of the summits, the other participating CEE countries have only 
had a chance to have a 15 minute face-to-face meeting with the Chinese PM with little 
opportunity to achieve deliverables. Therefore, the CEE countries have competed for 
the hosting role, with China apparently choosing countries where the summit could 
be linked with some headline-grabbing deliverables. Prague has reportedly failed to 
host a meeting despite repeated offers, perhaps pointing to China’s fear of negative 
attention to the summit if held in Prague.10
Annual summits started as a good opportunity for China to establish relations 
with CEE and bypass relations with the EU despite the fact that the format gathers 
12 EU members. Since then, the 17+1 framework has evolved and it is not anymore 
a one-sided presentation of Chinese intentions for this grouping of countries. And 
while summits host heads of governments and have been a good place for the an-
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nouncement of any results of cooperation, most of the work is finished between two 
summits and as a part of sectoral cooperation, with the facilitation of the Secretariat 
and other institutionalized mechanisms of cooperation in the 17+1 framework, show-
ing that cooperation between China and CEE is continuous, since it is in progress 
throughout the whole year.
In the run-up to the 2018 Sofia summit, there were some reports that China would 
downplay the format going forward, opting for biannual meetings and other chan-
ges due to concerns of the EU and a lack of results of the cooperation.11 However, no 
changes were made in the end and the cooperation seems to have stabilized, gaining 
new impetus by the 2019 inclusion of Greece. The 2020 summit is set to bring yet 
another change as it will be hosted by Chinese president Xi Jinping rather than PM 
Li Keqiang. It is yet to be seen whether this is a one-off adjustment based on protocol 
requirements or a permanent change to the summit meetings.
BILATERAL RELATIONS: DIFFERENT TRAJECTORIES
Participation in the 17+1 platform and close ties with China are presented as 
a matter of prestige that has been manifested through an increased number of visits 
of Chinese high level officials to CEECs as well as visits of CEECs’ leaders to China. 
For China, the format and especially the high-level summits have a cost-saving be-
nefit, as it enables Beijing to manage relations with 17 countries simultaneously. At 
the same time, the 17 countries have gained an unprecedented opportunity to meet 
Chinese partners regularly and explore cooperation opportunities.
While the emergence of the format has transformed the overall environment of 
the CEECs’ relations with China, the development of individual bilateral relations 
has varied significantly, with some countries taking the lead while others seeing 
limited development. On a similar note, while all the CEE countries have gra dually 
signed BRI memoranda, implementation has varied from state to state, proving 
“accession to BRI” to be mostly a political statement. The most significant uptick in 
bilateral relations, including high-level visits and political documents can be seen in 
Hungary, Czechia and Serbia. On the opposite side, countries such as Slovakia and 
Slovenia have not experienced any significant change in the previous trajectory of 
the relationship. The stances of individual countries have also undergone significant 
evolution, mostly towards a less active posture after the expected economic benefits 
from participation in the platform failed to materialize and as a reaction to EU and 
US misgivings towards the cooperation. This appears to be the case especially for 
Poland, Czechia and Romania. While no particularly strong domestic political debate 
has grown around the individual countries’ participation in the format, opposition 
politicians in Lithuania and Slovakia, for example, have expressed interest in rethink-
ing their participation.12 Similar voices have been heard in Czechia, although so far 
only from non-parliamentary parties and some NGOs13.
Moreover, despite the Chinese hope to improve “political trust” with the CEE 
countries through the format, political differences have (re)emerged in different 
countries to frustrate the bilateral relationships. In Czechia, Taiwan, Tibet and hu-
man rights issues have returned in full swing after being somewhat sidelined by the 
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previous administration between 2013-2017. Beijing reacted harshly to the Czech 
government’s stance on Huawei, just as it did in neighboring Poland. In Slovakia, the 
political relationship with China took a hit after the acceptance of released Uyghur 
prisoners from Guantanamo and the meeting of the Slovak president with the Dalai 
Lama in 2014 and 2016 respectively. A final example is the interference in counter 
demonstrations against pro-Hong Kong democracy events in Lithuania in 2019.14 
While these issues have mostly been bilateral, they have to some extent affected 
17+1 cooperation as well. For example, due to worsened relations with Czechia, the 
2019 Chinese Investment Forum under the 17+1 framework was canceled. In yet 
another case, the Chinese PM Li Keqiang reportedly scrapped his bilateral meeting 
with Slovak PM Robert Fico over the Dalai Lama meeting at the Riga summit.15
The record of political support for China resulting from 17+1 cooperation seems to 
be mixed. There have been salient cases of support for China on political issues, such 
as that of Hungary (e.g. refusal to sign a joint letter by EU ambassadors criticizing BRI 
or support for China’s stance on the South China Sea16) or Serbia (see below), but these 
appear to be more of a function of the peculiarities of the respective countries than 
a reflection of overall trends in CEE as a result of 17+1. In the July-October 2019 “letter 
wars” at the UN with groups of countries expressing condemnation versus support 
for China’s policies in Xinjiang, only Serbia joined the latter group. Lithuania, Latvia, 
Estonia and later Albania joined the critique while other CEE countries decided to sit 
it out.17 However, the silence of the other CEE countries can be attributed to long-term 
under-representation of these issues in their foreign policy, rather than an outcome 
of Beijing’s explicit or implicit pressure. 
The V4 countries have for a long time been seen by China as the most important 
partners in the CEE grouping. To a large extent, this stems from the fact that the 
four countries have taken the lion’s share of Chinese trade and investment with CEE 
countries. Hungary and Poland, the latter by far the largest V4 country, have been 
seen as strategically important by China. The region also assumed an important role 
in the forming of the 17+1 concept. While the first fully-fledged 17+1 meeting took 
place in Warsaw in 2012, it was preceded by a meeting of CEE economic ministers 
during the visit of Chinese PM Wen Jiabao in Budapest. The Hungarian capital also 
hosted the 17+1 summit in 2017.
Skipping summit meetings might be indicative of dissatisfaction with the co-
operation or the low level of attention paid to it. While Hungary has been present at 
all the 17+1 summits at the highest level, this was not so for the other V4 countries. 
Slovakia was only represented by its deputy PM in Suzhou in 2015 while Poland has 
sent its deputy PM to attend the meeting twice. It has been argued that Poland’s dis-
satisfaction with China’s stance on Russian aggression in Ukraine might have led to 
PM Eva Kopacz skipping the 2014 Summit in Belgrade.18 The Slovak PM Robert Fico 
bemoaned the lack of practical results coming out of the cooperation with Beijing 
prior to his no-show in Suzhou in 201519. Finally, lack of investments was cited when 
the previously staunchly pro-China Czech president Miloš Zeman announced that 
he would not attend the 2020 Beijing summit, with only the vicePM instead of PM 
Andrej Babiš to represent the country there.20
In the case of Czechia, China’s outreach towards the region through the 17+1 for-
mat brought about the opportunity to reopen high-level contacts that had been frozen 
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since the 2009 meeting of Czech PM Jan Fischer with the Dalai Lama. Moreover, 
soon the new leadership in Prague represented by president Zeman and the govern-
ments of PM Jiří Rusnok and PM Bohuslav Sobotka (since 2014) respectively, initiated 
a ‘restart’ of relations with China. Cooperation under the 17+1 with China provided 
for an increase in visits of Chinese officials to the Czech Republic and vice-versa. 
For example, the annual high-profile China Investment Forum held in the Czech 
Republic under the 17+1 format since 2013 has been attended by Chinese vicePM 
Zhang Gaoli or Politburo member Liu Yunshan. In the other direction, PM Sobotka 
attended the 3rd China-CEE Regional Leaders Summit and the 2nd China-CEE 
Health Ministers Forum held in China in 2016. The Chinese President Xi Jinping 
visited Prague in 2016, the first CEE country since becoming president, which was 
duly stressed in the Chinese media. During the visit a strategic partnership between 
the two countries was signed. Nevertheless, the large part of diplomatic dealings 
between the two countries in recent years is attributed to president Zeman, who has 
met with Xi Jinping seven times altogether, but has not been personally involved in 
the 17+1 cooperation, as it has been led by the government. The new government since 
2017 has paid less attention to China and coupled with political friction  (described 
above), Czechia has receded from its position as an active country vis-à-vis China 
among the CEECs. 
Slovakia has seen relatively little development of political relations with China 
since the establishment of the 17+1 format. Not much seems to have changed in terms 
of the quality of political ties as compared to the previous period. No bilateral visit 
on the Prime Ministerial or presidential level has been undertaken since 2012 which 
attests to the long-term absence of high-level contact. Political conflict over the ac-
ceptance of former Uyghur captives and meetings with the Dalai Lama put a dent 
into the relationship as well. Slovakia has also not hosted any high-level meeting of 
the 17+1 format so far. Therefore, most opportunity for contacts has been left to the 
annual heads of government meetings and attendance of Slovak representatives at 
ministerial-level meetings under the format. Slovakia’s reserved approach is reflected 
also by the lack of a top-level presence at BRI summits.
The mutual interest in developing relations between Poland and China preceded 
the establishment of the 16+1 format. It was as early as 2011, during the visit of the 
then-president Bronisław Komorowski to Beijing, that the two sides signed a strate-
gic partnership. The document, the second of such a kind between China and a CEE 
country after Serbia, was subsequently upgraded to a comprehensive strategic part-
nership in 2016 during Xi Jinping’s visit. 
In 2012, Poland’s capital Warsaw was the venue of the inaugural 16+1 summit, 
with Chinese PM Wen Jiabao announcing his offer to the region there. In terms of 
high-level visits, Polish president Duda visited China on the occasion of the Suzhou 
summit in 2015 and Chinese president Xi Jinping visited Poland in 2016. While the 
BRI summit in 2017 was attended by Polish PM Beata Szydlo, Warsaw only sent a de-
legation led by vice minister of finance Banaś for the 2019 summit. Coupled with the 
Polish PM’s no-show at the 16+1 Sofia summit in 2018, Warsaw seems to have had an 
ambivalent position towards China, with attempts to recalibrate its relationship in 
light of the unmet economic expectations.21 Especially since the election of Donald 
Trump as the US president and his subsequent attempts to limit China’s international 
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expansion, Warsaw has started to recalibrate its position vis-à-vis Beijing towards 
increased skepticism. 
Hungary has been the most enthusiastic partner of China among the V4 countries. 
The Orbán government foresaw the Chinese outreach towards the region in 2011, 
when it announced its “Opening to the East” policy although China-friendly policies 
have preceded Orbán’s government. As mentioned above, Budapest hosted the meet-
ing of economy ministers attended by Chinese PM Wen Jiabao in 2011 that led to the 
establishment of 16+1 a year later. Budapest was also the venue of the 16+1 summit 
in 2017, where a comprehensive strategic partnership between the two sides was 
signed. The Hungarian PM has attended all the summits of the 17+1 initiative as well 
as the two BRI summits. Orbán also visited China on two other separate occasions. 
Hungary is distinguished by hosting the highest number of China-CEE joint insti-
tutions among all the participating countries (except for China)22. The importance of 
Hungary within the format is also due to its co-hosting the project of a railway upgrade 
on the Budapest-Belgrade line, which has been cited by China as an important (and 
to date actually the sole) example of a cross-state infrastructure project in the CEE. 
However the project has turned out to be problematic due to suspicions surrounding 
the tender on the Hungarian side and has not yet been completed.23 
High level visits have not been a major feature of Sino-Baltic relationships. The 
Chinese president has come to the subregion only once (mid-2002), and thus it was 
the establishment of the then 16+1 framework that added a semblance of consist-
ency and regularity to the higher level meetings. Despite two occasions of PMs from 
China and the Baltics touching each other’s soil during the respective 17+1 summit 
meetings (Suzhou 2015 and Riga 2016), there were no highest-level visits outside of 
this framework for the first seven years of its existence. However, all of the Baltic 
presidents came to China in autumn 2018, the Estonian and Latvian ones in order 
to attend the so-called Summer Davos Forum in Tianjin, while the Lithuanian one 
to launch the Trade and Investment Forum in Shanghai. Notably, the Latvian and 
Lithuanian visits proved to be possible at least partly due to the presidents’ decisions 
not to meet the visiting Dalai Lama several months earlier. The issue was especially 
remarkable in the case of Dalia Grybauskaitė, as the Lithuanian head of state had met 
the Tibetan spiritual leader in a “private capacity” during his previous visit back in 
201324 which had caused a years-long period of Chinese economic retaliation against 
the country’s potential exporters by freezing negotiations.25
The composition of the Baltic states’ delegations sent to the 17+1 summit meet-
ings showcases the apparently lower level of priority in comparison to most other 
CEECs and provides several interesting clues. Although Estonia is the only Baltic 
state to always be represented by its PM in the summits thus far, it is also the one 
least mentioned in the guidelines out of all the CEECs. The PM of Lithuania has only 
skipped one summit meeting (Sofia 2018) sending in his stead the country’s minister 
of finance. Such a seemingly unusual choice was motivated by Lithuania’s ambitions 
to become a fintech gateway to Europe for China which was enshrined in the Sofia 
guidelines with its pledge to establish a 17+1 Fintech Coordination Center and conduct 
the format’s High-Level Fintech Forum in 2019. Curiously a 17+1 “network of fintech 
coordinators” was actually established during the Forum in Vilnius,26 probably as 
a result of the below-mentioned China-related controversies in the country. In any 
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case, Lithuania thus managed to find an additional sphere of expertise and coopera-
tion adding to its earlier interest in focusing on agriculture as showcased by hosting 
the 3rd China-CEECs Agricultural Ministers’ Meeting and the 13th China-CEECs 
Agro-trade and Economic Cooperation Forum in May 2018.
Although it was Latvia that failed to send its PM to the summit twice (Bucharest 
2013 and Dubrovnik 2019), both times being represented by the minister of foreign 
affairs instead, the Baltic region’s centermost country has clearly stood out in terms 
of the political relationships within the 17+1 format itself. Indeed, it was Riga that 
hosted the framework’s only summit in the Baltics so far, in 2016, thus attracting the 
only visit by the Chinese PM to the whole region to this day. During the event the 
need to strengthen the Adriatic-Baltic-Black Sea Seaport Cooperation was especially 
emphasized. No wonder since following the 2015 Suzhou guidelines the CEECs- 
China Secretariat on Logistics Cooperation27 was established in Latvia the same year, 
thus becoming the format’s first coordinating institution located in the Baltics. As 
expected, the 2016 Riga Summit was preceded by the 1st China-CEECs Transport 
Ministers’ Meeting and the 8th China-CEECs National Coordinators’ Meeting in 
May and October of that same year respectively. On a side note, the following year 
Chinese naval ships made a friendly port call in Riga soon after their below-mentioned 
joint military drills with Russia. Long eager to attract direct flights from China to 
the Baltics’ largest airport in Riga, Latvia hosted the 5th China-CEECs High-Level 
Conference on Tourism Cooperation in October 2019.
In the Balkans, four summits have been organized so far in Romania, Serbia, Bul-
garia and Croatia. In most cases, summits were seen as a chance for the promotion of 
cooperative projects or announcements of future cooperation with the host country. 
For Romania, it was a chance to sign agreements valued at more than 8 billion EUR. 
Almost none of those projects have been implemented in the end with a lot of them 
still being negotiated.28 When Serbia hosted the summit, the Chinese PM attended 
the official opening of the Mihailo Pupun bridge, the result of a Chinese preferential 
loan agreement. In Bulgaria, during the summit, a new Chinese Embassy was opened 
and in Croatia, the visit of high level Chinese representatives was a chance to pro-
mote the Pelješac bridge project that is being implemented by a Chinese construction 
company and financed from EU funds.29 Besides hosting the 17+1 summits, Balkan 
countries have also been promoting cooperation with China through bilateral visits 
and meetings with other Chinese representatives on the highest level. Most notably, 
Chinese leader Xi Jinping visited Serbia in 2016. His visit was interpreted in Serbia 
as another signal that the country is one of the most reliable Chinese partners in the 
CEE. The visit also resulted in the signing of an upgraded comprehensive strategic 
partnership.30 
While Serbia can be perceived as the country with the most intensive cooperation 
with China of all the Balkan states, other Balkan countries are trying to bring the 
level of cooperation to a higher, strategic level. This is true especially for countries 
with an uncertain path towards EU membership which not only left them without EU 
structural funds but also opened up space for third actors in the region (China, Russia, 
Turkey, etc.). Montenegro31 and North Macedonia have notable infrastructural projects 
with China. Albania, despite having had traditional relations with China during the 
communist period, does not seem to know how to utilize the 17+1 platform. Slovenia 
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has been on the sidelines of the platform, however, new developments, such as the 
the visit of Wang Yi, Chinese minister of foreign affairs, at the end of 2019, signaled 
that some development of relations between the two countries can be expected. Re-
lations between China and Bosnia and Herzegovina so far have been based mostly 
on sub-national cooperation due to close relations between Republika Srpska and 
Serbia, which created a context for cooperation with China and this Bosnian entity. 
The announcement of Xi Jinping’s visit to Serbia in 2020 made by the Serbian side32 
serves as another piece of evidence that Serbia has the most developed relations 
with China in the Balkans. In the wider CEE region Serbia will be the first of the 
CEECs visited by Xi Jinping twice, and also one of the few European countries that 
has hosted Xi more than once. This is again seen in Serbia as an important factor in 
the further development of relations between the two sides, given that China has 
been promoted as one of the most important foreign actors in Serbia in recent years.
LET’S PARTY, COMRADES:  
LOCAL POLITICAL PARTIES’ RELATIONS WITH CCP
Despite Beijing’s rhetoric of the 17+1 format being of “apolitical nature”33  China 
has initiated a dialogue of political parties with the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) within the 17+1 initiative as well as with individual countries. China’s stress 
on inter-party contacts illustrates some key trends: first, it shows the extension of 
party diplomacy, hitherto mostly limited to links with communist and leftist parties 
to cover the whole political spectrum; second, it points to the growing role of the 
party in China’s foreign policy at the expense of the state, especially under Xi Jinping 
since 2012; finally, it shows China’s self confidence to marry foreign policy with ide-
ology and actively promote the supposed advantages of its political system abroad. 
Inter-party cooperation with the CEE countries has been run by the International 
Liaison Department (ILD) of the CCP. The fact that Song Tao, the current head of the 
ILD, acceded to this role from his previous appointment as a vice-minister of foreign 
affairs and head of the China-CEE secretariat is worthy of attention. The scope of the 
ILD’s activities has gradually enlarged from ideologically fraternal parties (Vietnam, 
Cuba or North Korea) to wider partnerships as China has become more diplo matically 
active worldwide. The ILD’s work has been instrumental in giving legitimacy to 
China’s regime and its concepts for international relations. The most successful result 
of these efforts was the 2017 ILD-organized “CCP in Dialogue with World Political 
Parties Forum”, dedicated to the promotion of China’s “community of shared destiny” 
concept, with over 600 representatives from 300 parties.34 
Two main multilateral forums of inter-party cooperation under the 17+1 format 
have been held since 2012 – The China-CEE Young Political Leaders Forum and the 
Political Parties Dialogue. The Young Political Leaders Forum had been included in 
the 12 measures of Wen Jiabao and was held in 2013. Two more forums were held on 
a biannual basis afterwards. The cooperation has been shrouded in secrecy, with no 
clear list of participating parties. For example, attendees of the 2015 forum are only 
said to have included 50 representatives of 31 different political parties and youth 
organizations from CEE countries.35 The China-CEE Countries Political Parties 
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Dialogue has been held twice, in Budapest in 2016 and in Bucharest in 2017 with 
leading parties from some CEE countries (a prominent role again for Czech, Serbian 
and Hungarian representatives) in attendance. The societal part of this publication 
discusses the dialogue in more detail.
Interestingly, both multilateral dialogues were halted in 2018 and 2019. This 
may point to Beijing’s wariness that overt political contacts under the format may 
be controversial in the context of the worsening climate in the EU. However ac-
cording to reports, the 17+1 Political Parties Dialogue is to take place in 2020 again 
(probably to be tied with the Beijing summit to increase its profile) and the contacts 
seem to have been continuing in a different form in the meantime – for example, 
in November 2019, representatives of governing parties of CEE countries attended 
a roundtable with the CCP, organized by the ILD.36 Illustrating China’s view of the 
utility of inter-party cooperation, the vice-minister of the ILD, Qian Hongshan, was 
quoted as saying at the meeting that “the governing parties have the responsibility 
to exhibit political guidance” in China-CEE relations.37
In Czechia, Beijing has cultivated ties between the CCP and the local political 
parties as well as individual politicians. This has been particularly the case with the 
Czech Communist Party (KSČM) and the Social Democrats (ČSSD).38 CCP has va-
lued these ties greatly – as argued by the ILD vice-minister Zhou Li, the CCP’s ties 
with ČSSD, with which it signed an MoU on cooperation in 2012,39 were one of the 
chief pillars that helped reorient Prague’s policy towards China.40 Moreover, former 
ČSSD politicians-turned lobbyists have played an outsized role in the promotion of 
ties with China in the country.41 Recently, CCP also approached ANO, the leading 
party of the current government since 2017 with the hope of establishing relations.42 
KSČM and ČSSD representatives attended the Political Parties Dialogue meetings 
under 17+1 as well as the CCP in Dialogue with World Political Parties Forum in 
Beijing in 2017.43 In recent years, Czech politicians have maintained contacts with 
the ILD, despite the warnings of the Czech Security Information Service (BIS) that 
it is “a specific Chinese intelligence organization”.44
Czechia has also hosted several high profile CCP apparatchiks as opposed to 
representatives of the government. Hungary is another interesting case of inter-party 
dialogue. Despite the anti-communist roots of Hungary’s governing Fidesz party and 
its leader Viktor Orbán, it has developed extensive links with the CCP. It comes as 
no surprise that the inaugural China-CEE Countries Political Parties Dialogue was 
thus held in Budapest. Orbán used the highly charged keynote speech at the event 
to praise the CCP’s willingness to engage with parties in CEE despite ideological 
differences, something he claimed is not common in the EU.45 Orbán also attended 
the second iteration of the forum in Bucharest in 2017. The distinguishing feature 
of Orbán’s stance has been his active admiration of the Chinese political and socio- 
economic system, including the CCP leadership. This stands in contrast with Czech 
CCP interlocutors (except the communist party) who have largely tried to avoid 
publicity on their contacts, fearing domestic backlash. 
The Baltic states present China with particular challenges in terms of inter-party 
political relations. Although similar to the V4 countries in the following respect, the 
trio reached an even higher level of solidarity in banning both the communist party 
and communist symbols, thus making inter-party cooperation with the CCP more 
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controversial and difficult to achieve than in most other CEE countries. However, the 
region’s self-described socialist parties do indeed tend to view China more positively, 
and Latvia’s politically important Saskaņa (Harmony) Party particularly stands out 
due to its memorandum of cooperation with the CCP reached back in 2011.46 Thus 
far this move has not caused much domestic controversy, especially compared to 
the backlash against a similar cooperation agreement with Russia’s governing party 
showing how this kind of cooperation with China often flies under the radar.
Long being a serious issue for China due to their principled anti-communist 
stance and contradictory position on some of China’s so-called “core interests,” the 
Baltic states have increasingly become targets of its political influence47 activities as 
the August 2019 incident in Lithuania has shown. Although the country’s security 
agencies became the first ones in the subregion to identify China’s espionage activi-
ties as a threat to its national security, it was not long after visited by You Quan, the 
Head of the United Front Work Department.48 Three months later, on August 23, 2019, 
Lithuania along with the other two Baltic states commemorated the 30th anniversary 
of the Baltic Way, one of the world’s largest ever peaceful political demonstrations 
and a key event in their anti-Soviet liberation story. The eventful day took a rather 
unexpected turn when several hundred Lithuanians who had joined hands in soli-
darity with the protesters in Hong Kong were confronted by a small but vocal group 
of pro-Beijing counter-demonstrators in downtown Vilnius, the first such instance 
in the Baltics. Even more troubling was the fact that the counter-protest was directed 
by Chinese diplomats, including the ambassador himself, and involved representa-
tives of structures associated with the country’s soft power in general (Xinhua News 
Agency) and the united front work in particular, namely the local Overseas Chinese 
Association and the just-established Chinese Chamber of Commerce. The incident led 
to the summoning of the Chinese ambassador and an unprecedented public outcry 
in the country.49
In the Balkans, Serbia is the prime case of inter-party cooperation with China. 
Inter-party cooperation is actually long-standing and has survived the government 
changes in Serbia. The new era of contemporary relations between Serbia and China 
can be dated to 2009 when a strategic technical agreement was signed between the 
two sides during Boris Tadic’s presidency.50 The leading face of inter-party cooperation 
in Serbia was Vuk Jeremic, a former Serbian minister of foreign affairs turned president 
of the General Assembly of the United Nations (UNGA). After his term in UNGA, he 
founded an opposition People’s party in Serbia. Besides his official engagement, Jeremic 
was also a consultant for the rather infamous CEFC China Energy51 and has founded 
a think-tank, the Center for International Relations and Sustainable  Development 
(CIRSD) that has been organizing events and promoting Chinese presence through 
its publications. One of the members of CIRSD’s board of advisors is Li Wei, former 
Chinese minister of development.52 But Jeremic is not the only one – since the  regime 
in Serbia changed in 2012, the ruling Progressive party led by current Serbian presi-
dent Aleksandar Vučić has been promoting partnership with China and the CCP 
through the promotion of projects financed by Chinese loans as well as Chinese 
foreign direct investment. Another political party with close connections to China 
and the CCP is the Socialist Party. Aleksandar Antić, a vice president of the party, 
is a national Coordinator for 17+1 and one of the main  proponents of development 
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of relations between Serbia and China in the 17+1 framework.53 Additionally, Ivan 
Djokovic, a member of the Socialist Party and vice-president of Vojvodina provincial 
government, has been the primary contact between Vojvodina and China and has 
promoted cooperation both in Serbia in media statements and conference appear -
an ces, 54 as well as through official visits to China.55 
Serbia has hosted representatives of the CCP on several occasions, most notably 
the delegation of CCP led by Chinese Community Politburo member Yang Xiaodu 
that visited Serbia in October 2019, when they met with the Serbian PM, the PM of 
Vojvodina autonomous provincial government and the Serbian president. The host of 
that delegation was Marko Djuric, vice president of the Serbian Progressive Party. In 
2019, Marko Djuric also visited China in his official capacity on several occasions and 
has become the main representative of his party for cooperation with China and one 
of the most vocal politicians in Serbia regarding political support given to China, most 
notably providing full support to the Chinese reaction to the Hong Kong protests.56 
Promotion of Chinese presence by politicians, both from the ruling coalition and 
opposition parties, has created a positive milieu for China, not only among political 
elites, but also in the pro-government media.
It thus appears that Beijing has given an outsized role to party diplomacy in its 
dealings with particular CEE countries, seeking to build ties that would outlast res-
pective government coalitions. In general, the level of CCP party activities in the 
CEECs seems to be directly proportional to the level of the overall bilateral political 
relationships.
SUB-NATIONAL, UNDERESTIMATED?  
A BOOMING COMPONENT OF 17+1 COOPERATION
Surprisingly and without much notice being taken, sub-governmental relations 
between China and the CEE countries have become one of the leading forms of co-
operation in the 17+1 format. While not initially included in the 12 measures, they 
were already mentioned in the Bucharest Guidelines in 2013. China has presented 
regional cooperation as a success story partly as a way to mitigate the overall lack-
luster performance of the 17+1 format and the perception that not much of substance 
is being done. As seen below, while regional cooperation has indeed seen growth 
under the 17+1 format, it has not been universal for all the countries.
The stress on local cooperation has been part of the overall growth of sub- 
national contacts associated with the BRI. However, local cooperation has been part 
of  China’s external relations for decades, with partnerships between China’s regions 
and cities with European countries, chief among them the UK and Germany but also 
Poland and Yugoslavia, established already in the 1980s.57
In general, local relations are part of China’s soft power efforts and are classified as 
public diplomacy.58 For China, local-level relations can make the bilateral relationships 
more diversified and sturdy, especially due to the more results-oriented approach that 
is often the case on the local level. Furthermore, they do not bring the same level of 
scrutiny as is present at government level relations.
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Provinces have been incentivized by the central government in Beijing to aid the 
overall goals of China’s foreign policy by actively searching for CEE partners. The 
central government has granted specializations to the provinces both in cooperation 
areas as well as their geographic partners.59 For example, this has been the case of 
Ningbo which has taken the role of a hub for China-CEE regional relations.60
Despite the existence of a top-down approach, the provinces themselves have 
had their autonomous motivation to seek cooperation especially with the goal of 
promoting provincial enterprises and the local economy. In this respect, provinces 
have tried to take advantage of the central policy to achieve their own pragmatic 
goals. The Chinese approach has thus been a mix of top-down and bottom-up policies, 
following simultaneously political and economic goals.
On the side of the CEE countries, regional cooperation has created more oppor-
tunities for economic cooperation on specific projects, the success of which is often 
dependent upon the local environment. Local governments have also often followed in 
the steps of the central government’s policy, whilst it was making welcoming moves 
towards China. CEE countries have in general not seen regional-level relations as part 
of the political relationship with China, focusing rather on economic and cultural ties.
Regional cooperation has been developing within the framework of various 
institutionalized meetings, as has been the case for 17+1 format at large. These have 
included the local leaders’ meetings, the mayors’ meetings and the Forum of Capital 
City Mayors, conducted annually and biannually. The China-CEECs Association of 
Governors of Provinces and Regions was established in 2014. As is the case with 
the 17+1 format as a whole, the actual details on these events and institutions are 
very sparse, which leaves them non-transparent. Specific forms of cooperation have 
included setting up representative offices in the partner regions, trade and investment 
fairs for regional companies, setting up direct flights and railway cargo lines, and 
partnerships between regional universities, cultural events etc.
The experiences of specific countries manifest interesting differences. One of the 
most active countries in terms of regional cooperation seems to be Czechia. As of 2019, 
there are 18 individual partnerships of Czech regions and regional capitals with their 
Chinese counterparts. Czechia has also been tasked with leading this cooperation 
area in the 17+1 format, with the China-CEECs Association of Provincial Governors 
established in Prague at the 2nd China-CEECs Local Leaders’ Meeting in 2014. As 
discovered by previous research, it was actually mostly the Czech regional leaders 
themselves who were actively searching for cooperation partners in China as opposed 
to the initiative coming from the Chinese side.61 Still, the 3rd China-CEECs Local 
Leaders’ Meeting in Tangshan, China, held in 2016 was attended also by PM Bohuslav 
Sobotka, stressing the importance given to this agenda by the Czech government.
While mostly motivated by expectations of economic results, regional diplomacy 
became politicized in Czechia. The partnership concluded between Prague and Beijing 
in 2016 during the visit of Xi Jinping included a highly controversial article, expressing 
Prague’s support for the “One-China Policy”. When the new opposition government 
came to power in Prague in late 2018, it demanded the treaty be renegotiated and 
the controversial article left out. As Beijing was not willing to do so, the agreement 
was canceled in October 2019 and Prague moved to conclude a similar partnership 
with Taipei. Due to this move and other actions and statements of the Prague Mayor 
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regarding Taiwan, Tibet and human rights, China ‘punished’ Prague by canceling 
the tours of several Czech orchestras with other potential moves discussed.62 In 
January 2020, Shanghai announced that it was revoking its partnership with Prague 
as well, due to the city leadership’s moves regarding Taiwan.63 Prague (and Czechia) 
seems to have also been punished in the field of the heretofore vibrant direct flight 
cooperation.64 A planned connection from Prague to Shenzhen did not materialize, 
the connection to Beijing was scrapped and the number of flights to Shanghai cut.65 
While it is impossible to conclude if the airlines had been directed to do so by Bei-
jing, at the very least, these decisions were taken by the airlines to cut routes when 
their political expediency ran out. The Prague case demonstrates that even regional 
diplomacy can become controversial and political, especially if it gets enmeshed in 
the issues of bilateral relations. Moreover, it drove home the fact that all forms of 
cooperation are, in the end, at the behest of Beijing’s political favor. 
Poland, too, can be seen as a leader in regional level relations with China among 
CEE countries, both in the quantity and quality of relationships. Only three out of 
16 Polish regions do not have cooperation with China.66 The most important case is 
the Łódź region’s partnership with Sichuan, that has been ongoing since 2012 and is 
the most extensive regional partnership in the whole CEE. The first contacts between 
Łódź and Sichuan were initiated in 2012, after the conclusion of the Poland-China 
strategic partnership. Interestingly, the cooperation gradually grew out of an initiative 
of the private logistics company Hatrans, which operates the direct railway cargo 
connection opened between Łódź and Chengdu in 2013. The Łódź region and the city 
of Łódź opened a joint representative office in Chengdu in 2014, a move reciprocated 
by Chengdu and Sichuan province.67 Łódź and Chengdu also became sister cities. 
Partly due to lobbying by the Łódź government, Poland decided to choose Chengdu 
as the place of its new consulate in China in 2015.68 Apart from the robustness of 
cooperation, the Łódź case shows the potential of sub-national cooperation to also 
affect government-level policy.
The other two members of the V4 have put much less stress on local-level relations 
with China. In Slovakia’s case, this lack of interest mirrors the overall indifference 
towards exploring relations with China. Two regions and three regional capitals 
(out of 8) have some form of cooperation with China, but with very little substance. 
The same is the case with Hungary, although the number of partnerships is higher 
(11 regional partnerships and 7 regional capital partnerships). The limited substantial 
cooperation on this level with China can be attributed to the centralized governance 
structure in Hungary, where local governments have few powers. With the leading 
role undertaken by the government in Budapest, there has not been any incentive to 
develop relations on this level.
Since the Baltic trio is composed of comparatively small countries with no idiosyn-
cratic politically autonomous regions akin to the below-mentioned Balkan examples, 
sub-governmental relations with China have been most visible in the case of inter-city 
cooperation and twinning partnerships. Deemed to be less politically controversial, 
such relationships between Baltic and Chinese cities have been slowly developing, 
though at levels generally below the rest of the CEE countries. The three Baltic capitals 
of Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius all have twinning agreements with China’s major cities, 
Hangzhou, Suzhou and Guangzhou, respectively. However, a close interrelationship 
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between the national level and local politics in capital cities has already produced 
controversies as showcased by the above-mentioned incident in Vilnius that caused 
a brief public argument between its mayor and the local Chinese embassy.
Many sister city agreements actually predate 2012, but the creation of the 
17+1 platform has indeed contributed to their intensification, particularly through 
its Mayors’ Forum that has increasingly attracted delegations from the trio’s smaller 
cities and towns. Their Chinese counterparts seem to be willing to reciprocate such 
an interest, while their deepening contacts usually remain below the radar of public 
discourse in the Baltics. A telling example of this trend is a 2019 mid-autumn visit 
by the mayor of Harbin (population of almost 11 million with agglomeration) to Lat-
via’s Daugavpils (population less than 100,000)69 and Lithuania’s Rokiškis (population 
less than 15,000) as part of the previously agreed-upon twinning partnerships.70 
With a different internal structure in the Balkan countries, the Serbian Autonomous 
Province (AP) of Vojvodina has been developing close relations with Chinese prov-
inces and representatives. The PM of Vojvodina, Igor Mirović, led the delegation of 
Vojvodina during the visit to China in 2019. Novi Sad, as capital of AP Vojvodina has 
previously established sister city relations with Changchun, capital of the Chinese 
province Jilin which has served as a basis for further relations between Vojvodina 
and Jilin province. Besides Jilin, Vojvodina signed a letter of intent for cooperation 
with the Chinese province Hainan in 201671 and with Fujian province in 201872. 
Cooperation between Vojvodina and Fujian have been specifically defined within 
the framework of the 17+1 platform. Besides province to province relations, the PM 
of the government of Vojvodina hosted a delegation of the CCP in 2019 during the 
official visit of the Chinese delegation led by Yang Xiaodu, CCP politburo member. 
The complex internal structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina ensures a high level 
of autonomy for two constitutive entities. In addition to the high level of autonomy, 
political connections between the Republic of Serbia as an independent country and 
Republika Srpska as a constitutive entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina has created the 
context for political connections with China for Republika Srpska. Further develop-
ment of cooperation between Serbia and China has the potential to spill over into 
the cooperation between China and Bosnia and Herzegovina, both in the framework 
of 17+1 cooperation and in bilateral cooperation overall. Prime-Minister of the Re-
publika Srpska, Zeljka Cvijanovic, has hosted a delegation coming from the Chinese 
city Tianjin in an official capacity and has met with high level CCP representative 
Ji Guoquiang.73 In addition to that, the president of the Republika Srpska’s govern-
ment, Radovan Viskovic visited Beijing and met with Chi Jing, the representative 
of Beijing’s city government, highlighting the established international cooperation 
between Republika Srpska and China.74 High level visits and cooperation between 
the two sides appeared on the local level also. The Mayor of Banjaluka, Igor Radojičić, 
visited Tianjin in 2018 and has met with representatives of Tianjin province.
Sub-national cooperation between China and the Balkans is also visible through 
the China-CEECs Capital Mayors’ Forum established in 2016. Each iteration was 
organized in one of the Balkan countries. The initial Forum was held in Bulgaria, 
followed by the second Forum held in Montenegro, the third organized in Serbia and 
the fourth organized in Albania.
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Additionally, each of the Balkan countries have sub-national cooperation with 
Chinese provinces. Bulgaria and Croatia have established cooperation on the level of 
cities or regions, while Albania, Slovenia, Montenegro or Romania have not reached 
the level of cooperation below the national level, but are active in the 17+1 framework 
through established mechanisms such as Capital Mayors’ Forums, Local Leaders’ 
Meetings and the Association of Governors of Provinces and Regions.
CUTTING-EDGE, OR DRIVING A WEDGE: IS 17+1 DIVIDING EUROPE?
When China initiated the 17+1 format in 2012 it was a latecomer to the region 
of Central and Eastern Europe with external powers having a long established pre-
sence there. Due to the complicated nexus of geopolitical interests, China has faced 
an uneasy challenge of navigating the relationships and fashioning the cooperation 
with the CEE countries in such a way as to avoid provoking backlash from any of 
the powers. At the same time, the CEE countries have not been without agency. On 
the contrary, they have in various ways tried to use the relationship with China to 
position themselves vis-à-vis the EU, Russia and the US. 
Due to long standing Russian interest in the region and the significant divergence 
among CEE countries in their relations with Moscow (ranging from immediate se-
curity threat as perceived by the Baltic states and Poland to the cozy Serbia-Russia 
relationship), the question of how to approach Russia has presented a challenge for 
China in the region. When establishing cooperation with CEECs, China was cautious 
not to go too far into the Russian backyard, excluding Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, 
but also Kosovo which has not been recognized by both China and Russia, due to the 
traditionally good relations those countries have with Serbia as well as their own 
secessionist concerns. It could be said that Russian influence is more developed than 
Chinese, and that China is cautious not to threaten that influence in the zones where 
it is of strategic importance to Russia.
The United States has been another crucial power in the region. Its role remains the 
most important in the security field as with the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Serbia (North Macedonia’s membership awaits ratification), all 17 CEE countries 
are members of NATO. The US has not directly figured in the 17+1 cooperation with 
no mention in the official documents, except for the indirect reference to the com-
mon support for the WTO framework expressed at the Dubrovnik summit. At the 
same time, Washington has grown increasingly alarmed with China’s presence in 
CEE, especially under the Trump administration, which has manifested in a renewed 
interest towards the region. In February 2019, US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, 
made a visit to Poland, Hungary and Slovakia, with the main theme being Russia’s and 
China’s presence there.75 In Slovakia, Pompeo warned the government that it needs 
to “guard against China’s economic and other efforts to create dependence and ma-
nipulate your political system”.76 The issue of 5G technologies and Huawei was at the 
forefront of Pompeo’s visit. Pompeo made it clear in Hungary that cooperation with 
Huawei may have negative consequences for ties with Washington (he later secured 
even more success on the 5G issue during a visit to Estonia).77 Wang Yi’s visit to the 
region followed in July 2019, stressing the emergence of CEE as the new battleground. 
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Some CEE countries with close relationships to the US seem to factor the desire not 
to harm the relationship with Washington in to their policy towards China. This is 
especially the case with Poland, the Baltic countries but also Romania.78 Even Hungary, 
for example, stressed the point that cooperation with China does not compromise 
Budapest’s being a reliable ally of the US and within NATO.79 In general, however, it 
seems the CEE countries believe they can have both their relationship with China 
and with the US and that they are not mutually exclusive, with China only playing 
the role of economic partner.
The most immanent player, however, remains the European Union as 12 out of 
17 members of the platform are EU member states. The EU first expanded to include 
the CEE countries in a large eastward enlargement of ten countries in 2004, followed 
by the accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 and Croatia in 2013. The EU has 
also exercised influence through the extension of the accession process to the Western 
Balkan countries and through its external neighborhood policy. In the member states 
but also the aspiring countries, the EU has served as a crucial normative framework in 
both the economy and politics. Importantly, the EU as a whole remains the dominant 
economic power in the whole CEE region.
China’s position towards the EU’s role in the 17+1 framework has been quite 
complex and at times even contradictory. When Wen Jiabao announced the 12 mea-
sures in Warsaw in 2012, any mention of the EU was conspicuously absent. In this 
context, China’s inroads into the region have caused alarm in Brussels and the Eu-
ropean capitals (especially Berlin and Paris) about China trying to divide Europe 
and skirt EU rules and norms in member states and also aspiring Balkan countries. 
Connected to this has been a largely misplaced debate about China buying the favor 
of the CEE countries through investments and infrastructure, despite the structure 
of the China-EU economic relationship remaining heavily tilted towards the ‘old’ 
members of the EU and the actual record of political support by CEE for China being 
limited to a few cases.80
China has tried to address the EU’s concerns by inviting the EU and Germany 
as observers to the summits. Moreover, the EU rules and complementarity with 
China-EU relations have been subsequently stressed in all Chinese pronouncements 
and the official summit documents. Chinese official proclamations have even pro-
moted 17+1 as a tool to ensure the success of the continued EU integration process. 
This can be attributed not just to China’s change of rhetoric but also as a result of the 
insistence of some CEE EU members who were afraid of cooperation with China 
having a negative impact on their standing in the EU. Finally, the decision to further 
“Europeanize” the 17+1 through the accession of Greece (as opposed to eastward 
expansion) may be another form of building bridges and driving home the EU ori-
entation of the platform. 
At the same time, there is still some tendency in China to see the EU as an exter-
nal actor although it is integral to 17+1 cooperation on the merit of 12 participating 
countries being members of the EU themselves. While avoiding public announcements 
in this respect, Chinese experts often fret about the need to follow EU rules, seeing 
them as something “imposed by Brussels”. Other Chinese voices have criticized 
Germany for being afraid of losing its dominant economic position in CEE and thus 
putting obstacles in the way of its cooperation with China. Most importantly, Chinese 
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economic involvement, especially in the Balkans, has manifested an eroding effect 
on EU standards and norms convergence of the CEE countries.
And while China has been cautious about how it will position itself towards the 
EU in the context of cooperation with CEECs, the EU has been showing concerns 
about how the further development of cooperation between China and CEECs will im-
pact the level of democracy in those countries, and also the overall internal order and 
economy. For EU member countries, those concerns were institutionalized through 
a screening mechanism that will evaluate further FDI’s to EU member states. Even 
though China is not the only country that is investing in CEE EU member countries, 
this measure was interpreted as directed mostly at future Chinese investment. On the 
other hand, countries that are not EU members, like the Western Balkan countries, 
have been targeted by EU criticism that deeper cooperation with China could take 
them further from EU membership prospects given that the high level of cooperation 
can make those countries ‘trojan horses’ of Chinese influence. Not being EU members 
gives countries like Serbia a lot of space to establish principles of cooperation with 
China on premises that are not in line with EU principles. Looking at it in the short 
term, it could benefit the country and bring quick economic development, but in the 
long term it could negatively influence its prospects of EU membership.
2020 is poised to become a critical year in EU-China and CEE-China relations. 
With the goal of reshaping the relationship with China, Germany’s EU presidency 
is planning a special 27+1 format EU-China summit in Leipzig, with all EU member 
states getting a seat at the table.81 It remains to be seen if Germany, France and other 
influential EU members will sidetrack their efforts to nurture a privileged bilateral 
relationship with China and open the doors to a real EU-wide effort on China.
CHINA IN CEE POLITICS: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
China can indeed be credited for the latest definition of CEE as a region and even 
the nascent institutionalization of it.82 Many countries (particularly the Baltic trio, 
Slovenia and Croatia) were not comfortable at the beginning with such an inclusion 
and association with CEE or even parts of it as continues to be the case with the 
“Balkan” identification of Romania, Bulgaria and most recently Greece. The 2019 ac-
cession of the latter country has problematized that definition even further.
The 17+1 framework has been characterized by a hub and spokes logic of coop-
eration with China taking the lead in “multilateral bilateralism”. The institutional 
framework and also the focus of cooperation has evolved gradually, without there 
being a clear blueprint at the start. Overall, the cooperation has remained rather loose 
with (so far) no signals of future institutionalization.
The target areas of cooperation as present in the guidelines have grown to en-
compass issues related to the BRI and recently also to the global agenda. However, 
the common documents show that China has not been able to transplant its foreign 
policy concepts into the language of cooperation with Central and Eastern Europe. 
On the contrary, the CEE countries have successfully shaped the language to stay in 
accordance with the EU framework and their national interests.
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The 17+1 cooperation has almost universally led to the growth of high level po-
litical contacts between the region’s countries and China. However, the development 
of bilateral relationships has been happening along separate trajectories, with some 
CEE countries achieving more intensive cooperation while others remain largely 
passive. It is rather the activity and decisions taken by 17 CEECs than the format 
itself which act as a decisive factor in this respect.
While some countries, especially Hungary and Serbia have supported China on 
political issues, these have been more of an exception than the rule. At the same time, 
some CEE countries have actually worsened their political relations with China due 
to conflicts on human rights, Taiwan and other issues. Therefore, the often heard 
assumptions that CEE as a whole have become more forthcoming towards China on 
political issues is not supported by the evidence.
China has used the CEE as a testing ground for the more activist party diplomacy 
led by the Chinese Communist Party both through multilateral forums and bilateral 
contacts. Most of the cooperation has been happening in a non-transparent manner, 
raising doubts about its nature and purpose. China’s goal seems to be to cultivate 
relationships with important political elites to assure the long-term pro-China in-
clination of the respective countries.
Development of sub-national cooperation within 17+1 has been one of the un-
derestimated dimensions of cooperation between China and CEE. Yet, the substance 
of cooperation has varied from country to country, evading general conclusions. The 
case of the Prague-Beijing relationship demonstrated that even local cooperation is 
not insulated from political tensions.
Third parties have played an important role in the development of 17+1 coo peration. 
China has unsuccessfully tried to assuage the EU’s concerns about China using the 
format to divide Europe, although actual cases of CEE countries turning towards 
 China at the expense of their overwhelming EU orientation has been limited. US- 
China rivalry has become a factor in CEE relations with China, with several countries 
afraid of endangering their traditional ties with Washington. Due to the sensitive 
perception of Russia in the region but also its continuing interests in the region, China 
has tried to walk a fine line in its approach towards Russia in CEE.
Since China has already demonstrated its determination to institutionalize “multi-
lateral” cooperation platforms in Europe through the 17+1, further compartmentalizing 
and “sub-regionalizing” initiatives can be expected in the future. Southeastern Europe, 
for the purpose of simplicity defined here as the ‘Balkans’, would be the first target 
of such efforts due to its much larger size (10 countries) and lack of self-identification 
consensus in comparison to both the V4 and the Baltics. The sequence of the summits 
has already provided some grounds for speculation that China differentiates at least 
between the Eastern (Romania and Bulgaria) and Western Balkans, with Slovenia 
and Croatia being looked at as more Central European countries than Balkans given 
their EU membership.
Based on the evaluation of political relations between China and the 17 CEE 
countries through the 17+1 format, the format itself should not be discarded. On the 
contrary, the 17 countries should utilize it to better serve their interests.
The simplified view of Europe being divided by China through 17+1 should be 
opposed as it infantilizes the CEE states and denies them agency. The EU institutions 
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and Western EU members should recognize the interest of the CEE countries in im-
proving their relations with China. The EU needs to include the CEE EU members 
in the efforts to shape a common EU policy towards China that should represent the 
interests of all the member states.
Putting one’s house in order is a precondition for the EU to being an effective 
player towards China. The internal division of the member states has not been created 
by China, but has been skillfully used at times for its benefit.
First and foremost, the EU should open a clear path to membership to the Western 
Balkans countries to offset the growth of China’s political influence. The 17 countries 
should also improve their communication and coordination in feasible areas to build 
the 17+1 into a multilateral forum serving primarily their interests. Competition for 
China’s attention among the CEE countries will only erode their bargaining position.
More attention should be given to the sub-national dimension of China-CEE co-
operation that has largely gone under the radar until now. While mostly motivated by 
economic interest, the CEE states should pay attention to the potential politicization 
of such cooperation and China’s efforts to take advantage of the lower profile of local 
contacts to avoid attention.
The increased prominence of the CCP in the Chinese approach towards the CEE 
warrants vigilance. There should be greater scrutiny by the civil society and media 
towards non-transparent dealings between local parties and the CCP. The democratic 
CEE parties should understand that by engaging with the CCP, they help it to cir-
cumvent official government contacts and diplomatic channels.
The 17 countries should watch closely and act in accordance regarding China’s at-
tempts to extend the membership of the platform and its further institutionalization. 
China’s assurances that the platform is in accordance with the EU’s policies along with 
the region’s peculiar geographical position should particularly emphasize the need 
to better integrate the Eastern Partnership countries into 17+1 projects, particularly 
those emphasizing connectivity.
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2. Economic relations: A sugar 
cane, or a sugar-coated stick?
Ágnes Szunomár, Liisi Karindi and Andreea Leonte
CEE countries have increasingly perceived China as a country which could bring 
economic benefits to the region through developing trade relations, growing inflows 
of Chinese investment and recently also through infrastructure projects carried 
out by Chinese companies and financed from Chinese loans. This chapter examines 
China’s presence in CEE by mapping trade and investment relations, issues of con-
nectivity and infrastructure, financial cooperation and tourism.83
When compared to China’s economic presence globally or in the developed world, 
China’s economic impact on CEE countries remains small. However, it has increased 
significantly in the past decade leading to a number of challenges. Despite a politically 
driven warming up of bilateral relations, the trade relations remain relatively low, 
leading to increased deficit. Chinese FDI flows to the region are modest, concentrated 
in a few, mainly EU member countries. Infrastructural projects are negotiated all over 
the region but implemented ones are rare to find, while financial cooperation is also 
in its infancy yet. More and more Chinese tourists are visiting the region, however, 
it is not entirely clear whether this is a result of the 17+1 cooperation or due to the 
country’s expanding army of middle class travelers.
NOT SO SPECIAL: MODEST IMPACT OF 17+1 ON TRADE RELATIONS
A comparative analysis of 17 Central and Eastern European countries’ trade with 
China reveals that the majority of the countries (especially in the Baltic and the Bal-
kans) have a relatively low trade with China. Within the whole CEE region the four 
Visegrád countries show the highest trade flows, followed by Romania, Slovenia, 
Serbia and Bulgaria. A common feature of CEE trade with China is a considerable 
and – in the past fifteen years – steadily increasing deficit. In 2018 the deficit amounted 
to around 75 billion USD. As the V4 countries (especially Poland) receive the majority 
of Chinese exports, their deficit values are the highest as well. 
Trade between V4 countries and China has increased the most in the past few 
years, however, the increase dates back prior to the official launch of the 17+1 initiative: 
to the early 2000s, coinciding with the accession of CEE countries to the European 
Union. In the case of imports from China the platform indeed gave a new impetus 
to relations, however, while the V4’s imports from China increased substantially, 
the growth of V4’s exports to China remained rather modest after 2012, and even 
decreased slightly for a few years after 2014. As a result, the trade deficit increased 
rapidly. 
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In the case of the V4, especially Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia, the export 
 depen dency on Germany is obvious: 25-30% of V4 exports are directed to Germany, 
while indirect exports (where goods are declared for export in, for example, Slova-
kia and leave the EU customs territory from Czechia) elevate this dependency even 
further.84 The products or spare parts are often exported to China from Germany. 
The fact that the three above-mentioned V4 countries are in a constant trade surplus 
with Germany may give a more nuanced picture on these countries’ trade deficit 
with China.
If we analyze the trends broken down by each of the V4 countries, the increase in 
Chinese imports since 2012 is the highest in the case of Poland and Czechia (79 and 
66%, respectively), while the increase in imports from Hungary and Slovakia is rather 
modest (18 and 14%). Slovakia’s imports even decreased for three years in a row after 
2014. When it comes to V4 countries’ export performance, the numbers are less im-
pressive: Czechia, Poland and Hungary export about the same value, while Slovakia 
lags behind. The export increase between 2012 and 2018 was the highest in the case 
of Czechia (above 50%) Poland (43%) and Hungary (31%) and shows a 7% decrease in 
the case of Slovakia. Although Polish, Czech or even Hungarian percentage numbers 
may suggest a significant increase in these countries’ exports to China, it has to be 
emphasized that they started from a very low initial export amount, where the ab-
solute change has still remained relatively small, therefore these numbers may give 
a misleading indication of countries’ relative performance and the role China plays 
as an export destination.85
GRAPH 1: TRADE BETWEEN THE VISEGRÁD REGION AND CHINA (IN MILLIONS USD)
Source: own compilation based on UN Comtrade (https://comtrade.un.org)
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MAP 2: MAJOR COMMODITIES EXPORTED FROM 17 CEE COUNTRIES TO CHINA
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In all V4 countries, the main import products from China are machinery and 
electronics. On the export side, V4 countries’ exports consist of product groups such 
as vehicles, machinery and electronics with the exception of Poland, where besides 
the aforementioned product groups, metals (such as refined copper and copper alloys) 
represent a significant portion of its exports to China. Although China’s hunger for 
high-quality agricultural products has been growing globally recently, the share of 
agricultural exports is not significant: below 6% in Poland’s and Czechia’s total exports 
to China, and less than 3 and 1%, respectively, in the case of Hungary and Slovakia.
When examining the patterns of trade between China and the V4 in the past fif-
teen years, it has slightly changed as well. These structural changes are characterized 
by a sharp rise in exports of high-tech products, increasing the high technology inten-
sity of trade. The high-tech exports volume and share to China has been the highest 
in the case of Hungary. However, the high technology intensity of trade is mainly 
due to the large flows of automotive, electronics and telecommunications products, 
based on the activity of multinational companies in global production networks, not 
in local companies.86 Therefore, the bulk of foreign trade between V4 countries and 
China has been and still can be bound to certain products and several (multinational) 
companies. Because the volume of trade is relatively small (compared to, for example, 
V4’s trade with the EU or Germany) one decision of a global company concerning 
relocation or change in internal deliveries among affiliates can significantly change 
the trade volumes of a given country vis-à-vis China.
Trade between countries in the Balkans and China has also risen since 2012. In 
contrast with V4-China trade relations, where Chinese imports increased to a greater 
extent than exports, a 50% increase on the import side and a 65% increase on the ex-
port side can be observed in the Balkans. However, since the starting trade volumes 
were different in the case of imports and exports (imports from China were 5 times as 
many as exports to China in 2012), the trade deficit persisted, although declined a bit. 
The intensity of trade varies from country to country: Greece and Romania are 
China’s most important trade partners from the region, both for imports and exports, 
followed by Slovenia, Serbia and Bulgaria as further important import partners and 
Bulgaria, Slovenia and Croatia on the export side. China is among the three main 
trade partners of three Balkan countries – Albania, Montenegro and Serbia. Based on 
UN Comtrade statistics, currently, all 10 Balkan countries have a trade deficit with 
China, with Romania leading the group, with an enormous 4.425 billion USD trade 
deficit, followed by Greece (3.177 billion USD) and Serbia (2.075 billion USD).
The increase in Chinese imports since 2012 is the highest in the case of Serbia 
and Montenegro (94% and 80%, respectively), followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Albania, Bulgaria and Serbia (all around 50% to 60%) and Slovenia, North Macedonia 
and Greece (around 40%). In Croatia Chinese imports even decreased by 36% during 
the period, potentially due to a decline in purchases of Chinese textile-related pro-
ducts, mainly footwear and apparel.
While Chinese imports in the Balkans are similar to Chinese imports elsewhere 
within the CEE region87, the Chinese export baskets of most of the Balkan countries 
are characterized by low value-added products and/or consist of a few raw materials. 
Montenegro exports almost exclusively aluminum ores and lead ores to China. These 
metals constitute 94% of the country’s exports to China. North Macedonia exports 
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iron alloys which constitute almost 60% of the country’s overall exports to China.88 
Chromium ore exports are responsible for more than 86% of Albania’s exports to 
 China, while in Bosnia and Herzegovina agricultural products (such as lumber and 
beech) and textile products cover up to almost 80%. Although Serbia exports agricul-
tural products (45-55%), such as tobacco and wood, since the launch of the 17+1 initia-
tive a rising share of the machinery, electronics and vehicle sectors89 can be observed. 
Although Bulgaria and Greece are EU members, where production – and exports 
– are usually oriented towards higher added-value products, their Chinese export 
basket shows more similarities with the non-EU countries of the 17 CEECs, which 
is characterized by lower value-added production and exports. Greece exports salt, 
sulphur, cement and mineral fuels (60%) as well as agricultural products such as paper 
waste, olive oil and fruits (10 %) to China, while around 70% of Bulgarian exports 
comprise copper, ores, slag and ash. In contrast, in the case of three other EU member 
countries – Slovenia, Croatia and Romania – the export structure is different from 
the aforementioned countries with machinery, electronic products and vehicles 
 responsible for the major share of their exports to China.
In Slovenia, there is a slight but persistent increase in exports to China after 2015, 
as a result of the upturn in the country’s automotive exports. Apart from components, 
Slovenia did not export to China in this category before, but after 2015, automotive 
accounts for more than 20% of Slovenian exports to China. This shift is probably due 
to Revoz, Slovenia’s only automotive manufacturer and one of the largest exporters, 
starting to produce – and export – Renault and Daimler models, including the new 
Twingo and Smart Forfour. Similarly, from 2016 onwards, there is a significant surge 
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GRAPH 2: TRADE BETWEEN THE BALKAN REGION AND CHINA (IN MILLIONS USD)
Source: own compilation based on UN Comtrade (https://comtrade.un.org)
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in Croatian exports to China which can be attributed to transport vehicles, especially 
cargo ships and other vessels. Transport vehicles were previously exported to China 
to a value of only a few million dollars, but in 2016 this category accounted for one 
third of total exports (and then fell slightly in 2017). Other Croatian traditional ex-
port sectors include machinery, electronics and wood. Finally, the main Romanian 
products exported to the Chinese market have been industrial machinery, optical and 
medical apparatuses, electrical machinery, vehicle parts and components, such as car 
tires, together with some textile and agricultural products such as apparel and wood. 
Baltic-China trade has also increased since the inception of the 17+1 initiative. 
Patterns are similar to the V4-China trade relations: Baltic countries’ imports from 
China increased to a much greater extent than their exports to China, as a result the 
trade deficit has risen rapidly.
When it comes to trading with China, the three Baltic countries started from an 
even lower base than the V4-China relations. The increase in Chinese imports since 
2012 is the highest in Lithuania (48%), followed by Latvia and Estonia (29% and 
18%, respectively). Latvia’s and Lithuania’s export performance to China between 
2012 and 2018 seems huge, above 150% in both cases but these figures alone are 
again misleading as both countries started from a low level (below 100 million USD). 
Estonia’s exports to China show a 60% increase but the base was just slightly higher 
in 2012: 135 million USD. 
The main import products from China are electrical and industrial machinery 
and textiles in all three cases. On the export side, however, Baltic countries’ exports 
vary considerably. In Latvia, agricultural products (mainly wood) cover up to 45-50%, 
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GRAPH 3: TRADE BETWEEN THE BALTIC REGION AND CHINA (IN MILLIONS USD)
Source: own compilation based on UN Comtrade (https://comtrade.un.org)
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with minerals and metals playing an important part as well. In Estonia, electrical as 
well as industrial machinery and equipment constitute a half of the country’s exports 
to China, while agriculture (wood and fish) represents 30%. In Lithuania, metals, 
machinery and textiles together represent more than 60% of the country’s Chinese 
exports, with agriculture (wood) playing a prominent role too.
Although indirect exports may also play a role, re-exports also have to be taken 
into account. In 2017, for example, re-exports of goods from Lithuania to China in-
creased by almost 62% and reached a value of 48.7 million EUR. The main growth 
drivers were re-exports of machinery and mechanical appliances, mineral fuels and 
mineral oils and electrical machinery and equipment.90 In Estonia re-exports are the 
highest in optical, photo, technical and medical apparatuses, electrical and electronic 
equipment as well as machinery, nuclear reactors and boilers.91 Latvia does not pro-
vide data on exports of Latvian origin or re-exports. However, taking into account 
some similarities in the structure of exports to China with Lithuania, re-exports 
would probably take place in industries such as copper, wood, mineral fuels and oils, 
machinery and mechanical appliances, electrical machinery and equipment as well 
as fruits and nuts.
All three Baltic states have been working hard to improve trade relations with 
China by signing protocols for exporting dairy, meat and fish products as well as pro-
moting their respective countries in China. In general, the Baltic states are not well 
known among Chinese consumers which makes it hard for the companies to sell to 
them. Often better-known labels like EU or Nordic/Northern Europe are used. Thus, 
the trade deficit remains an issue not so easily solved by increasing exports of local 
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GRAPH 4: COMPARING V4, BALTICS AND BALKANS TRADE DATA (IN BILLIONS USD)
Source: own compilation based on UN Comtrade (https://comtrade.un.org)
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produce. Foreign companies like Ericsson contribute greatly to export numbers in 
Estonia, with electronic equipment making up 31% of all exports to China. Also, wood 
and articles of wood tend to be one of the main export categories in the Baltic states 
(24% of exports to China in Estonia, 45% in Latvia, and 17% in Lithuania, whereas 
furniture and prefabricated buildings constituted 22% of Lithuanian exports to China).
To sum up, Visegrád countries are the most important partners from the group of 
17 when it comes to trading with China: in terms of volume the V4 countries import 
from and export to China more than the Baltic countries and the Balkans combined. 
As a result, the trade deficit between the four Visegrád countries and China is is 
many times that of the other two groups. 
The structural picture remains quite stagnant for the whole CEE region, espe-
cially in the case of imports from China, which is in fact similar to imports from 
China to anywhere else in the world (mainly electronics, machinery and textiles). 
This hasn’t changed a lot since 2012, leading to the conclusion that the 17+1 platform 
has not affected the structure of bilateral trade relations with China. 
In contrast, CEE exports to China differ significantly within the region: V4’s ex-
ports to China are dominated by foreign (mainly Western European) multinationals 
and high value-added products, while low value-added products and raw materials 
characterize the Balkans’ exports to China. The Baltic countries lie somewhere in 
between, with both electronics and machinery as well as metals, agricultural and 
textile products in its export basket. 
WE ARE THE CHAMPIONS:  
V4 COUNTRIES AND CHINA’S FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS
The share of Chinese FDI in Central and Eastern Europe, compared with all the 
invested capital, is still very small, yet in the last few years the capital inflow has 
accelerated significantly. When searching for possible factors that make the region 
a favorable investment destination for China, the cost and quality of labor is to be 
considered first: a skilled labor force is available in sectors for which Chinese interest 
has been growing, while labor costs are lower in CEE than the EU average. How-
ever, there are differences within the CEE region as well; labor costs are lower in the 
Balkans than in the V4 or the Baltics. Nevertheless, these differences don’t seem to 
really influence Chinese investors as – even if more expensive in terms of labor cost 
than the Balkans – there is more Chinese foreign direct investment in the V4 than 
in the Baltics or the Balkans. Other, presumably institutional and political, factors 
might also play a role here.
Similarly to trade relations, CEE countries host Chinese FDI to varying degrees: 
the four Visegrád countries take more than 75% of the total Chinese OFDI to the 
17 CEECs, while the other thirteen countries – despite slight increases in many cases - 
haven’t received significant amounts of Chinese FDI flows so far. The reason behind 
this difference is twofold: 1) Chinese companies prefer EU member states. As Chinese 
companies are often targeting EU markets with their products, they prefer to establish 
or purchase company sites in EU member states to avoid trade barriers such as tariffs 
and non-tariff barriers (e.g. quotas or embargoes) to market access. 2) China plays safe. 
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It targets with FDI Central and Eastern European countries that have already attracted 
investments from elsewhere, for example the US, Japan or Western Europe. Indeed, 
in general, FDI in V4 countries is the highest in the CEE region.
Chinese investors typically target secondary and tertiary sectors of V4 countries. 
Initially, Chinese investment flowed mostly into manufacturing (assembly), but over 
time services attracted more and more investment.92 The main Chinese investors tar-
geting these countries are interested primarily in telecommunications, elec tronics, the 
chemical industry and transportation.  In addition to the chemical company Wanhua, 
the largest investor in V4, major investors are Huawei, ZTE Corporation, Lenovo, 
BYD and Comlink. The ownership structure of the investing Chinese companies is 
rather mixed: some are state-owned companies (such as Wanhua or ZTE) as well as 
nominally private firms (such as Huawei or BYD). However, the majority of private 
companies are so-called national champion companies of China, which assumes home 
country support even if the owner is not directly the Chinese state. 
Regarding the Chinese companies’ entry modes, greenfield investments dominated 
and were especially common for the first Chinese investors (Hisense, Huawei, ZTE, 
Lenovo, TCL) bringing assembly activities to the region in the early 2000s. Since 2011, 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) gained importance (Wanhua/Borsodchem, Liu Gong 
Machinery), while there were also examples of founding joint ventures (Orient Solar, 
BBCA, Shanghai Shenda). Hungary has received the majority of Chinese investment 
in the region, followed by Poland and Czechia, while Slovakia lags a little behind due 
to its small size and lack of efficient transport infrastructure. Since Chinese companies 
appreciate a business agreement being supported by the host country’s government, 
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GRAPH 5: CHINESE FDI STOCK IN V4 COUNTRIES (IN MILLIONS USD)
Source: own compilation based on OECD data (https://data.oecd.org)
Em
pt
y 
sh
el
l n
o 
m
or
e:
 C
hi
na
’s
 g
ro
w
in
g 
fo
ot
pr
in
t i
n 
C
en
tr
al
 a
nd
 E
as
te
rn
 E
ur
op
e
44
Hungary’s high-level strategic agreements with foreign companies combined with the 
lack of ‘controversial’ gestures of its political representation spurred Chinese invest-
ment into the country. In the framework of such agreements, Wanhua, for example, 
agreed to establish its European Information Centre in Hungary for developing the 
operations and the supply network of the company93, while the Bank of China pro-
mised to build closer relations with the Hungarian Investment Promotion Agency and 
Eximbank, and promotes Hungary in China as a European investment destination.94 
The Balkan countries haven’t so far received big amounts of foreign direct in-
vestment from China, despite the fact that some of them are EU members and others 
potential candidates. Romania, Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria are the top recipients; they 
host 80% of Chinese FDI stock in the Balkans (still, it is just one quarter of Chinese 
FDI stock in the Visegrád region). Based on Chinese statistics, countries such as Al-
bania95 and Bosnia and Herzegovina seem not to attract any significant Chinese FDI 
at all (data indicates both are below 10 million USD), while North Macedonia, Monte-
negro, Slovenia and Croatia also host less that 100 million USD Chinese FDI stock. 
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Source: own compilation based on data provided by the National Bureau of Statistics, China96
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The above-mentioned trend may soon change, especially in the case of the EU 
member states in the region, as China has become very active in the Balkans recently. 
Chinese PM Li Keqiang visited Croatia for the first time in 2019. On this occasion the 
two countries signed several Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) on investment, 
aiming to strengthen economic relations.97 For this purpose, a joint task force for 
investment cooperation was established. Huawei’s interest in contributing to the de-
velopment of smart city solutions in the future, was also addressed. In Slovenia there 
is but one FDI case that is worth mentioning: one of the eight largest manufacturers 
of home appliances in Europe, Gorenje was acquired by Chinese company Hisense 
in 2018 for 339 million USD.98 This purchase went through one of Hisense’s foreign 
subsidiaries, therefore it doesn’t appear in Chinese statistics.
As an EU member state, Romania is the most popular investment destination for 
China in the Balkans. Chinese companies target similar sectors as in the Visegrád 
region. The biggest investors are Huawei, ZTE, China Tobacco International Europe 
Company, Eurosport DHS (bicycle producer), but there are some other important 
Chinese companies that have invested in Romania indirectly, through foreign com-
panies that were purchased by a Chinese company, such as Smithfield99, Pirelli100 
and Nidera101.
Chinese FDI in Bulgaria is less significant compared to Romania, however, it 
also hosts important companies in telecommunications, electronics and automotive 
sectors. The main Chinese investors are Huawei, ZTE, Shanghai Video and Audio 
Electronics Group, Great Wall Motors and Insigma Technology, which operates 
desulfurization facilities. There are examples of FDI into agriculture (Tianjin State 
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Farms  Agribusiness Group) and rather curiously into the media sector, as recently, 
China Today has entered the Bulgarian newspaper market, sharing the same editors 
and having the same headquarters as Russia Today.
In Serbia Chinese companies started to invest in 2016: the Chinese iron and 
steel manufacturing conglomerate Hesteel Group acquired the Smederevo steel mill, 
saving the financially distressed company as well as 5,000 jobs. Later on a few other 
companies – such as the automotive parts producer Mei Ta – arrived, while a number 
of significant investment projects to Serbia were announced during the visit of Pre-
sident Vučić and his ministers to Beijing in September 2018. The agreements included 
greenfield projects like the construction of a tire factory in Zrenjanin, a Chinese 
takeover of the firm Mining and Smelting Combine Bor (RTB Bor), and construction 
of an industrial park close to Belgrade.102 These FDI cases are closely connected to the 
energy sector which is in line with China’s Belt and Road initiative.
When it comes to Greece, as a newcomer to the 17+1 group, it is hard to evaluate 
the effects of this cooperation on Chinese FDI stock in the country but even before 
joining the group, Greece enjoyed a privileged position since COSCO, China’s ship-
ping giant, operates the Piraeus port. China – together with Hong Kong – belongs 
to the top ten source countries of foreign investment in Greece over the last decade, 
increasing significantly their investment presence during the last few years.103 Chi-
nese companies showed an interest in a wide area of sectors, including infrastructure, 
energy, real estate and high-tech. In one of the latest high-level meetings at ministe-
rial level, the two countries discussed the possibility of future investments in waste 
disposal technologies.104
While the Balkans as a region is the second option for Chinese companies in CEE 
after the Visegrád region, the Baltics comes in third. Even though the Baltic states 
have been mentally quite open to Chinese investments and have made active use of 
the 17+1 format to promote their opportunities, the Baltic region hosts only a bit more 
than 2% of Chinese FDI stock in CEE, 12 times less than the Balkans. 
Two possible reasons for the lower representation of Chinese companies in this 
region are likely: 1) Chinese companies preferred to target countries which are rela-
tively bigger, more populous and closer to Western European markets with their 
greenfield projects. 2) China has been interested in big infrastructure projects or 
M&A deals in the technology sector, where small countries have not much to offer. 
Latvia is the only country in this region that managed to increase Chinese FDI stock 
by 23 times, however, this stock is still only around 100 million USD. The country 
gained some Chinese investments into the real estate sector due to its “golden visa” 
program105. Lithuania has positioned itself as the gateway to Europe for Chinese 
fintech companies and received a few investments in that segment. In Estonia, the 
best-known deal so far has been the takeover of Magnetic MRO by Guangzhou 
Hangxin Aviation Technology for 43 million EUR in 2018. Historically, the top deal 
in the region has been, however, the takeover of Nordic Cinema Group for 865 million 
EUR by AMC Theatres, which at the time of the deal was largely owned by Wanda 
Group, but the company was forced to sell some of its shares later in order to reduce 
its debt in China.106
With the growing awareness of potential challenges from Chinese investments 
to national security, some countries have strengthened their policy and legal frame-
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work to better control such situations. Poland and Hungary have already created 
their own investment screening mechanisms and in Czechia the law is expected to 
be implemented in 2020, while Slovakia seems so far not to be considering drafting 
a law. Latvia established a mandatory review mechanism for transfer in ownership 
of companies and facilities “with significance to national security” or of national and 
European critical infrastructures.107 Lithuania adopted an updated version of the law 
on the protection of “objects of importance to ensuring national security” to require 
notification and facilitate vetting of investments in certain economic sectors or in 
certain protected zones.108 Estonia has not updated the current regulatory frame-
work nor has it established its own mechanism, but it relies on the EU regulation 
on coordination.109 The majority of Balkan states, however, have not even considered 
creating such a mechanism.
Interestingly, where the mechanism was already in place or was in the pipeline, 
it was not necessarily in line with the model defined by the European Commission: 
the Polish law introduced a much more invasive system, allowing the Polish state to 
police more directly the domestic investment market, while the Hungarian system 
utilizes  a rather obscure and politicized oversight mechanism that is less bound by 
all of the principles mentioned in the EU’s regulation.110 However, there has been no 
record yet of a foreign investment project under investigation based on the screening 
mechanisms. Without a sufficient number of records, it is difficult to predict whether 
these rather newfangled screening mechanisms will affect Chinese FDI in the region 
but since governments decide on whether to block a deal or not, the impact will be less 
significant in countries that have stronger, more friendly relationships with China. 
ALL ROADS LEAD TO CHINA:  
COOPERATION IN INFRASTRUCTURE AND CONNECTIVITY
Interestingly but understandably, the patterns of Chinese infrastructure projects 
in the CEE region are just the opposite of the FDI patterns. Infrastructural projects 
are implemented rather in the non-EU states of the 17CEECs in the Balkans, since 
the infrastructure is relatively poor there, and strict EU rules and regulations do not 
hamper negotiations and processes, while other resources (such as EU structural 
funds) are not available or are less accessible.
In its first infrastructure-building attempts in CEE, China tried to replicate its 
experience from developing countries in Southeast Asia or Africa not considering the 
different (and sometimes very strict) rules and regulations or standards of the EU.111
Currently, China is planning and negotiating several infrastructure-related pro-
jects in the 17 Central and Eastern European countries. China is interested in building 
highways, constructing or reconstructing railways as well as building or expanding 
power plants (among others thermal, hydro, coal-fired as well as nuclear power plants). 
When taking a closer look, a clear link can be found between China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative and the 17+1 platform. On one hand, the CEE region is a strategic area for the 
Belt and Road and infrastructure cooperation of this kind can also enhance relations 
between China and the CEE countries. On the other hand, China can also learn from 
the experiences of the 17+1 initiative so far and can use it in its broader Belt and Road 
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strategy.112 Such experiences are, for example, that more effective communication and 
a clearer definition of goals could help in the future to avoid excessive expectations 
and subsequent backlash and doubts.
China’s motivations are easy to understand, as BRI will allow it to expand its 
political and economic sphere of interest. Once the alternative transport routes are 
completed China will be in a more favorable strategic position as it will have more 
alternative transport routes, will be able to reach its target markets easier and faster 
and to work off some of its industrial over-capacities accumulated in recent years. 
In addition, projects completed in the 17 CEECs may provide a reference for further 
Chinese investment in the broader region, especially in Western Europe.
Central and Eastern European countries have been cautiously welcoming of the 
BRI, including V4 countries. Hungary was the first European country to sign a memo-
randum of understanding with China on promoting the Silk Road Economic Belt and 
Maritime Silk Road, during Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Budapest 
in June 2015. The Hungarian government was very keen on the railway project and 
when it signed the construction agreement in 2014, Prime Minister Orbán called it 
the most important moment in cooperation between the European Union and China.113
During the then Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s visit to Warsaw in 2012 China 
offered a special credit line worth 10 billion USD to the CEE region to be used for 
investments in infrastructure, modern technologies and the green economy. This 
credit line was part of 17+1 cooperation, available for all countries gathered in the 
initiative. However, later on it turned out that EU member states could not use those 
funds as certain conditions of this funding opportunity (such as the requirement 
on involvement of Chinese companies and materials) may go against EU rules, for 
example on public procurement regulations.
One of the most salient areas of cooperation between China and the CEE coun-
tries in recent years in terms of connectivity has been in rail freight. The decreased 
cost of rail freight transport, infrastructure improvements and progress in customs 
cooperation among the involved countries leading to shortened travel times have 
injected impressive growth into the China-Europe freight rail connections. With 
their geographical position, the CEE countries are the natural gateway to EU markets. 
Openings of new connections have been used by China to herald the results of the 
cooperation under 17+1 and BRI and have gained significant coverage in Chinese 
state media.
While the first connections between China and Europe – officially branded as the 
China-Europe Express later on – were tested in 2008 by private companies115, they 
have grown exponentially ever since, gaining political support under the BRI and 
17+1 initiatives. While there were only 11 China-Europe trains in 2011, the number 
has grown to 8,255 in 2019.116
The China-Europe express can bring economic benefits for the involved coun-
tries, including from tariff settlements, fees for the use of their rail infrastructure 
and rolling stock and also impetus for the growth of the logistics sector.117 So far, 
the biggest benefactor of the China Europe express connections has been Poland, 
as around 95% of all the connections have taken the route via the Poland-Belarus 
border, using the Małaszewicze terminal.118 The city of Łódź in Poland itself services 
25% of all China-Europe trains.119 
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TABLE 1: LIST OF CHINESE PROJECTS — CONSTRUCTION/RECONSTRUCTION/
EXPANSION — UNDER IMPLEMENTATION OR NEGOTIATION IN 17 CEE COUNTRIES SINCE 
THE INITIATION OF 17+1114
country projects
Albania ‘Blue Corridor’/Adriatic-Ionian see connection (potential); motorway between the Albanian 
Ionian Sea to the Bulgarian Black Sea (potential till 2018, when the Albanian Government 
decided to build it with Albanian companies)
Bosnia and 
Hercegovina
Stanari thermal power plant; Tuzla coal-fired power plant (the credit agreement has been 
signed but the construction works have not started yet); Banovici thermal power plant 
(potential); Banja Luka-Nov Grad motorway; Vukosavlje-Doboj highway and Vukosavlje-Brcko 
branch
Bulgaria Four motorways (Veliko Tarnovo-Russe, Vidin-Botevgrad, Varna-Burgas) and a tunnel under 
the Balkan Mountains (Gabrovo-Kazanlak); Varna port development; modernization of 
the Novi Sad-Subotica railway section (potential); development of a logistic base near to 
Burgas; Belene nuclear power plant; Plovdiv airport management for 35 years (plus potential 
expansion)
Croatia Pelješac Bridge (under construction); modernization of the Zagreb-Rijeka railway;  
Banja Luka-Split motorway (potential)
Czechia New blocks on Dukovany nuclear power plant (company China General Nuclear Power 
Corporation (CGN/CGNPC) raised interest); Hodonín logistic centre (potential, planned  
in 2015)
Estonia Construction of Rail Baltica (Chinese raised interest); FinEst Bay’s Tallinn-Helsinki tunnel 
(potential)
Greece Further expanding Piraeus port; the development of Athens’ former airport at Hellenikon; 
lignite power plants at Megalopoli and Meliti (both bids failed)
Hungary Belgrade-Budapest high-speed railway (planed to be built by 2023)
Latvia Construction of Rail Baltica (Chinese raised interest)
Lithuania Construction of Rail Baltica (Chinese raised interest); Klaipeda port (potential);  
Kaunas combined heat power plant (potential)
North  
Macedonia
Kozjak hydro power plant; two stretches on the motorways linking Kichevo-Ohrid and 
Miladinovci-Shtip 
Montenegro Smokovac-Matesevo highway; Bar-Boljare highway; Mozura Wind Park; investment in various 
energy projects (e.g. hydro power plant, thermal power plant – all potential); renewal of the 
country’s ship fleet (potential)
Poland Logistic hubs connected to the Chengdu-Europe Express Rail (for example in Małaszewicze, 
Kutno and Łódź); Jaworzno coal-fired power plant (a Chinese company raised interest, 
a contract has been made but in the end the cooperation failed)
Romania There are no finalized projects yet, despite the many initiatives, such as various nuclear, 
thermal and hydropower plants; the Constanța-Bucharest-Budapest high-speed rail and 
Bucharest-Iași-Chișinău high-speed rail line or the restart of the direct air connection between 
Bucharest and Beijing 
Serbia Danube (“Mihajlo Pupin”) bridge in Belgrade; Belgrade-Budapest high-speed railway (planed 
to be built by 2023); the Belgrade-Niš-Preševo railway; construction of the Obrenovac-Ub and 
the Lajkovac-Ljig sections of Corridor XI motorway; the Surcin-Obrenovac section of Corridor 
XI motorway; construction of highway between Belgrade-Zrenjanin and Zrenjanin-Novi Sad 
(planning and technical documentation for the project has already started); 350MW unit at 
Kostolac thermal power plant (credit agreement has already been signed, construction has 
not started yet)
Slovakia There are no projects under implementation. No potential construction projects seem to be 
negotiated. The project of a hydroelectric dam on river Ipeľ was discussed in the past but 
did not come through due to unwillingness of the Slovak government to provide sovereign 
guarantees. 
Slovenia Krško nuclear power plant (potential); Divača-Koper railway line (potential)
Source: authors’ own collection
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Although Slovakia has tried to promote itself as an alternative route, with a tar-
get to process 50% or China-Europe rail cargo, its share has remained negligible.120 
The chief reason has been the situation in Ukraine which several times led to transit 
being stopped completely. Latvia has been another champion of rail freight transport, 
hoping also to take advantage of its ports for further shipment by sea. The Latvian 
Ministry of Transport even has a representative in China, stressing the importance of 
connectivity issues for Latvia which has also spearheaded cooperation with China in 
this area within 17+1. A potential for growth of transport also exists on the so called 
Land-Sea Express Route that joins the port of Pireaus and Central Europe through 
the Balkans and Hungary.121 
However, rail freight cooperation with China is not always smooth. Mirroring 
the overall trade imbalance in China-EU trade, rail transportation has been over-
whelmingly tilted towards inbound cargo to Europe, with trains often returning 
half-empty on the return journey to China. For this reason and also because of the 
overall higher costs of transporting goods to Europe by rail as opposed to sea, the 
connections have been heavily subsidized by local governments in China, leading to 
significant market distortions.122 With the central government planning to gradually 
withdraw the subsidies, it remains to be seen how much of the current trade vol-
ume will continue.123 Finally, despite the lowered costs, rail transport only remains 
competitive for a selected segment of goods, where transport faster than by sea but 
cheaper than by air is necessary.
Since companies and public institutions from EU states have access to more 
attractive forms of funding, including EU structural funds, there are not too many 
infrastructure projects in the V4 or in the Baltics. The  aforementioned Chengdu- 
Europe Express Rail connecting Chengdu with the Polish city Lódź was already in 
operation before the 17+1 cooperation was initiated, and keeps on expanding,124 while 
the Budapest-Belgrade railway – although the contractor has been chosen – won’t be 
ready before 2023. Chinese companies have raised an interest in several projects in 
the V4 region, such as Dukovany nuclear power plant, but V4 countries seems to be 
more cautious with Chinese (as well as Russian) constructors.
While V4 countries are more cautious or bound by EU rules and regulations when 
it comes to Chinese construction projects, the Balkan countries are in a very different 
situation. As seen in the table listing key Chinese projects under implementation or 
negotiation in the 17 CEE countries since 2012, while there are only a few potential 
projects in EU member states, there are a number of potential projects in non-EU 
countries that have either begun or have already been completed.
Also Baltic states have been actively promoting infrastructure development and 
connectivity via land and sea. For a while, talks about potential Chinese investments 
into Klaipeda port have been ongoing, with no concrete results yet. Both Estonia and 
Latvia have been trying to promote their ports to Chinese partners, however, without 
a clear success so far.125 In addition, Latvia has been active within the 17+1 format in 
establishing collaboration in the logistics sector by creating the CEECs-China Sec-
retariat on Logistics Cooperation and trying to open a train route to the region from 
China.126 Rail Baltica is the largest infrastructure project in the region, however, as 
the project is financed by the EU and the three Baltic governments, it remains subject 
to the relevant procurement procedures.127 Another project of potential interest from 
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Chinese companies has become FinEst Bay’s Tallinn-Helsinki tunnel which should 
be finished as early as 2024.128 The implementation of this project is still under dis-
cussion as there is a certain skepticism concerning its completion time as well as its 
profitability.129 
The Baltic states have been keen on building 5G infrastructure and have been 
allegedly willing to collaborate with Huawei on this matter and recent pressure from 
the USA influenced decision-makers in this regard. On 31 October 2019, Estonia 
signed a memorandum with the USA to strengthen cooperation on 5G security and 
development, restricting the use of the Chinese mobile technology company Hua-
wei’s products.130 As a reaction, Huawei announced that it would reconsider continuing 
offering its new models on the Estonian market.131 In Latvia, Huawei’s partner Bite 
Latvija decided to continue to work with Huawei citing other companies in Europe 
such as Deutsche Telekom, Elisa, Orange, Telia Sonera and Vodafone that do so.132 
Furthermore, Latvia’s Tele2 has chosen Huawei for its first 5G handset.133 Lithuania 
has taken a more careful approach, advocating for decisions on Huawei technologies 
to be taken at NATO and EU levels.134 
Attitudes towards 5G and Huawei differ in V4 countries, too. In September 
2019, Poland made a political statement showcasing its support for the US stance 
on 5G by signing a joint US-Poland declaration on 5G.135 However, as of early 2020, 
it seems that the Chinese company will not be completely excluded from the Po-
lish market. The Czech National Cyber and Information Security Agency issued 
an unprecedented warning against Huawei in 2019, following the announcement 
of the German government which did not exclude Huawei. Nonetheless Prague 
will most likely follow Germany’s approach, despite the US preference.136 Hunga-
ry went even further since the Hungarian MFA already announced in Beijing in 
November 2019 that Huawei would build its 5G wireless network.137 Based on the 
Slovak Prime Minister’s declaration, Slovakia does not seem to consider Huawei 
to be a security threat (in the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary).138 
In the Balkans, Romania also signed an MoU with the US, in August 2019, to exclude 
Huawei from 5G network development. Other countries in the region are, how ever, 
less committed. Despite concerns raised in some EU countries, Serbia has been co ope-
rating with Huawei for a long time: “Safe city” and “Smart city” projects have been set, 
while the state-owned telecommunication company Telekom is already working on 
the construction of telecommunication infrastructure that will enable 5G technology 
with Huawei being the key partner in the project. Since the US banned Huawei from 
the construction of 5G infrastructure, the representatives of Serbia have stated that 
there are no concerns regarding Huawei, that they are satisfied with the cooperation 
and that it will be further developed139. 
FOLLOW THE MONEY: FINANCIAL COOPERATION IN V4
When analyzing financial cooperation between China and the CEE region, the 
Visegrád region seems again to be the most active. The Hungarian Minister of Fi-
nance has recently called financial cooperation one of the most rapidly growing areas 
of Hungarian-Chinese relations.140 And indeed, the Bank of China has established 
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a regional and CEE headquarters in Budapest, while Hungary was the first sover-
eign issuer, in 2017, sold government bonds (dim sum and Panda bonds) both on 
the onshore market and in Hong Kong.141 Furthermore, the Hungarian OTP Bank, 
the largest commercial bank in the country, opened its first office in Beijing in 2017. 
Bank of China in Hungary and China UnionPay issued the first Chinese renminbi 
and Hungarian forint debit card in 2017, which was also the first case of a renminbi 
bank card to be issued in Europe by Bank of China.142
When it comes to Chinese banks in the V4, in Hungary and Poland there are 
branches of Bank of China (opened in 2003 and 2012, respectively), while the Czech 
branch of BOC, which was opened in 2015, belongs to the Hungarian branch of the 
bank. BOC doesn’t have any representation in Slovakia although the Slovak PM Fico 
has long lobbied for a Chinese bank to set up operations in Slovakia. Warsaw and 
Prague already host branches of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), 
while ICBC is, at the time of writing, looking into the possibility of opening a branch 
in Hungary.143 Similarly, Hungary and Poland decided to join the Asian Infrastruc-
ture Investment Bank (AIIB), while Czechia considered joining for a while but did 
not initiate it and it is unlikely in the current atmosphere that Czechia would join. 
Slovakia has no immediate intention to participate.
When compared to the Visegrád region, Balkan countries have a relatively weak-
er level of financial cooperation with China. For example, only three of ten Balkan 
countries decided to become members of the AIIB: Romania joined in late 2018, while 
Greece, together with Serbia, joined in summer 2019. The majority of these countries 
lack any Chinese banks in their respective territories. Exceptions include Serbia – 
where the Bank of China opened its first branch (2017), being the first Chinese bank 
in the country, as well as in the Balkan region – and Romania (2019). The Agricultural 
Bank of China also opened its first office in Romania in the same year. The China 
Construction Bank announced its intention to enter Bulgaria in July 2019,144 while 
two banks (BOC and Commercial Bank of China) have expressed their interest in 
entering the Greek market.145 
In the financial sector, China’s UnionPay International (UPI) expanded to Serbia 
(2018), Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (2019). UnionPay has already been work-
ing with the Croatian bank of Privredna Banka Zagreb (PBZ) so that UnionPay cards 
can now be utilized locally. When it comes to Chinese loans to realize the already 
mentioned infrastructure projects in the Balkans, it is usually China Ex-Im Bank 
that finances the projects.
None of the Baltic states has become a member of the AIIB.146 However, within 
the 17+1 format, Lithuania has been the most active in promoting itself as the FinTech 
gateway to Europe by developing a FinTech coordination centre in Vilnius. The Bank 
of Lithuania signed a cooperation agreement with the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission in 2015.147 Since then it has granted four Chinese companies electronic 
money institution licenses and one payment institution license and an additional 
10 companies intend to join the bank’s central payment system Centrolink.148 Coope-
ration has also been established between UnionPay International and Swedbank, one 
of the largest banking groups in Northern Europe and the Baltic Sea. UnionPay sees 
the Baltic states as emerging travel destinations in Europe for Chinese tourists as 
well as having increasingly closer economic and trade cooperation with Asia Pacific, 
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especially Hong Kong, South Korea and Russia, where UnionPay cards are used on 
a large scale.149 
THE IRRESISTIBLE DRAW: CHINA-CEE TOURISM AS A SUCCESS STORY
The CEE region is becoming an attractive place to visit for the continuously 
expanding Chinese middle class. Over the course of 2018, the top three European 
destinations in terms of volume of Chinese arrivals were the United Kingdom (up 
2.4%), Germany (up 2.6%), and France (up 7.7%), however, the three fastest growing 
destinations were Croatia (up 45.7%), Estonia (up 35.8%), and Hungary (up 25.1%).150
The Visegrád countries are among the most popular destinations for Chinese 
tourists within the CEE region. Since tourist groups from China typically visit their 
destinations as part of a travel package, the majority of them visit at least three – if 
not all – countries of the V4. A Budapest tour is usually merged with a journey to 
Czechia and Austria, while other countries of interest include Poland, Croatia and 
Slovenia. The trend is also contributed to by direct flights between Beijing and major 
V4 cities, such as Budapest, Prague and Warsaw. On average, Chinese tourists spend 
some 12 days in Europe during one visit. 
Prague is the most popular destination for Chinese tourists visiting the V4 region: 
from over 21 million people that visited Czechia in 2018, 619,000 were Chinese.151 
The high number can mostly be put down to the direct flights that opened in the 
last few years between China and Czechia: direct air connections operate between 
Prague and four Chinese cities (Beijing152, Shanghai, Xi’an and Chengdu).
In 2013 at the Bucharest summit, China called upon Hungary to establish  a co-
operation platform in the field of tourism with the aim of increasing tourism co-
operation between China and the CEECs resulting in the establishment of the Central 
and Eastern European Countries’ Tourism Coordination Centre. But, apart from this, 
most of the official tourism agencies have a Chinese language site and/or customized 
travel services for Chinese visitors.
As far as Hungary is concerned, the number of Chinese tourists has grown 
based not only on direct flights (Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu, Xian and recently also 
Chongqing) but also customized services, such as the opening of 14 Hungarian visa 
offices in China or the quick – within 48 hours – issuance of accepted visa applications. 
According to the China National Tourist Office in Budapest, 256,000 Chinese tourists 
visited Hungary in 2018 (while 23,600 Hungarian tourists visited China during the 
same period), and 262,000 tourists arrived in the first 11 months of 2019153. A simi-
lar increase in Chinese tourists has been seen in Poland. The country was designa -
ted - as the only European country – by China Travel Agency magazine as the „New 
Holiday Destination of the Year 2018”. In 2017, a record number of 138,000 Chinese 
tourists visited the country, while these numbers increased even further in 2018.154 
The numbers grew for Slovakia as well. Although the numbers of Chinese tourists 
in Slovakia are lower (61,000 in 2017), it was twice as many as in 2016.155
Among the ten countries in the Balkans, only Greece has a direct flight connec-
tion with China (between Athens and Beijing), operated by Air China since 2017. In 
addition to this already existing connection, another direct flight between Athens and 
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Shanghai has been announced to open in June 2020, operated by the Shanghai-based 
Juneyao Airlines.156 Serbia did have a direct flight connecting Belgrade with Beijing, 
launched in 2017, and operated by the Chinese Hainan Airlines, however, this route 
was closed in November 2018, after one year of operation because it was not profit-
able and carried only a few passengers.157 Before that JAT Yugoslav Airlines launched 
a flight to Beijing in 1979 and operated until late 2000. Romania’s Ponta government 
also wanted to restart the direct air connection between Bucharest and Beijing, with 
the Romanian national airline Tarom, however, the flights were stopped in 2003 due 
to their low profitability. The restart was thus never achieved – the official reason 
given in 2014 was that Russia denied the right for Tarom to fly in its airspace. Chinese 
airlines are also considering launching a direct flight between Zagreb and Beijing, 
while there are further countries from the region, including Macedonia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Slovenia and Montenegro, that are also seeking to boost the number of 
Chinese tourists visiting their nations with a direct air connection.158 
Even if a direct flight connection is not an option for most of the Balkan coun-
tries to increase the number of tourists from China, they have taken other steps to 
attract Chinese tourists, such as abolishing visa requirements or granting visas free of 
charge. A mutual visa exemption exists between China and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
which took effect in 2018, resulting in a growing number of tourists.159 Serbia has 
had a mutual visa free bilateral policy with China since 2017. This tourist friendly 
system brought over 92, 000 Chinese tourists to Serbia during 2019, five times more 
than in 2016.160 In 2018, Albania also announced a visa-free policy for citizens from 
Bahrain, Belarus, China, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Thailand.161 This 
visa-free policy helped to develop tourism as by June 2018 the number of Chinese 
tourists was estimated at about 8,600, double the number registered in the same 
period of the previous year.162
Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Montenegro don’t have any preferential visa policy 
towards China and the number of Chinese tourists is not that significant either. In 
order to boost tourism, the Bulgarian Minister of Tourism has signed an agreement 
with China’s leading tour operator, HiSeas International, and has announced that the 
Bulgarian official tourism portal will be available in Chinese.163 
Romania, too, lacks a preferential visa system for Chinese citizens. However, 
the visa regime for Chinese citizens was simplified in 2017.164 Even so, the number 
of Chinese tourists is very small and the number of visas issued by the Romanian 
embassy in Beijing between 2017 and 2019 averaged around 3,300. Currently,  Croatia 
and Slovenia do not have any preferential visa treatment for Chinese nationals 
either. Nevertheless, the number of tourists has been growing in both countries. 
In 2018 the number of Chinese tourists was estimated at about 250,000 in Croa-
tia while in Slovenia this number has increased by 300% since 2015 when it was 
only 50,000 (0.8% of all tourists).165 To facilitate consumption by Chinese tourists 
within the country, Slovenia has set up payment points for Alipay, the Chinese 
mobile application.166
As mentioned above, the Beijing-Athens direct flight has benefited tourism in 
Greece, along with the involvement of some big Chinese companies that offer special 
tourist packages for Chinese Nationals (e.g. COSCO Shipping, Fosun)167. At present, 
around 200,000 Chinese nationals visit Greece each year.168 Greece has a golden visa 
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program in place that grants five-year residency rights for all investors who make 
strategic investments in Greece (over 250,000 EUR) or buy real estate, with a possi-
bility to renew the residency permit if the investment remains in Greece. After seven 
years of uninterrupted residency a resident can also apply for citizenship.169 In the 
context of this publication, it is worth mentioning that more than 65% of the golden 
visa holders are Chinese.170 
Similar to other regions, tourism is one of the most important industries in 
the Baltic region. In 2019, the Estonian Tourist Board at Enterprise Estonia put out 
a tender to find a partner in China to more actively promote Estonia as a tourism 
destination.171 In 2017, 20,000 tourists arrived from China to Estonia – five times more 
than in 2016.172 In Latvia, the number was 22,774, but declined a bit (-0.2%) the year 
after.173 In Lithuania, in 2018, incoming tourism from distant markets grew rapidly, 
with 20.6% more from China than a year earlier.174 It was especially the success of 
Finland in attracting Chinese tourists that has made the regional players look into 
ways of getting them to move further into other Baltic countries, stay longer and 
spend more. The Estonia-based cruise ship operator Tallink Grupp and some other 
operators in the tourism sector have also introduced Wechat Pay, AliPay as well as 
UnionPay to better serve their Chinese clients.175 In order to promote Latvian busi-
nesses on the Chinese market, the Latvian Investment and Development Agency 
signed an agreement on long term tourism cooperation with the Alibaba Group on 
China’s largest travel website Alitrip in 2017.176 Furthermore, in 2018, China’s CMB 
Financial Leasing Co., Ltd. and airBaltic signed a Letter of Intent for the “sale and 
leaseback” of four Airbus A220-300 aircraft, which coincided with speculation about 
the possibility of direct flights taking off from Latvia to China.177 
It seems that the 17+1 cooperation has led to better promotion of the 17 CEE 
countries which has resulted in an increasing number of Chinese tourists in several 
countries of the region. However, it is not entirely clear whether these developments 
are due to the better promotion of CEE countries in China or China’s expanding army 
of middle class travelers: wealthy Chinese take an average 5.9 international trips per 
year178 and European destinations are on their shortlist. Nevertheless, the CEE re-
gion is far from being “invaded” by Chinese tourists: based on the number of nights 
spent at tourist accommodation in CEE countries by Chinese tourists, calculated by 
Eurostat, Chinese tourists represent less than 1% of all tourists in the region.179 Based 
on the Eurostat dataset, this ratio is the highest in Czechia and Hungary (1,4% and 
1,16% of all tourists) and the lowest in Bulgaria (0.18%).180
THE ECONOMY OF PROS AND CONS:  
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
When compared to China’s economic presence globally or in the developed world, 
China’s economic impact on CEE countries is relatively small. CEE countries are 
highly dependent on both trade and investment relations with developed, mainly-EU 
member states, while China represents a minor (although increasing) share. As far as 
trade or investment statistics are concerned, the CEE region is also far from being 
among the most important partners for China.
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Trade relations remain relatively low and unbalanced, leading to an increasing 
trade deficit in all the 17 countries with China. The structure of CEE exports is cha-
racterized by higher value-added products in the case of the Visegrád region,  Lithuania 
and Estonia, while the Chinese export baskets of most of the Balkan countries – with 
the exception of Slovenia, Croatia and Romania – consist of low value-added products 
and/or a few raw materials. 
Chinese FDI are modest and concentrated in a few countries with Hungary, 
Czechia and Poland being at the forefront, with almost no opportunity for the other 
countries to receive big amounts of investment, especially not in the higher value- 
added sectors. Infrastructural projects – financed from Chinese loans – are negotiated 
all over the region but non-EU countries seem to be more open to use this oppor-
tunity while EU member countries in Central and Eastern Europe express growing 
reservations in this regard. Although financial cooperation is gaining momentum, it 
is currently limited to EU member countries. 
Tourism is perhaps the real success story of economic cooperation within the 
framework of 17+1, since CEE countries have been achieving higher visibility in 
China, however, the growing number of Chinese middle class travelers may also 
play a role here. 
Although China created the 17+1 platform to deal with the CEE region, it has to 
be emphasized that it still handles its economic affairs on a bilateral basis with the 
CEE countries. Bilateral relations especially with the countries of the Visegrád region 
and Serbia seem to be of particular importance. Relations with other CEE countries 
are lagging behind with with only slightly beneficial or stagnating results.
Most of the CEE countries don’t have a clear China strategy and even if they have 
their own economic intentions, they do not coordinate among themselves. As a result, 
17+1 economic cooperation is mainly driven by China: China sets the agenda that 
the 17 countries rarely question. In order to benefit more from economic cooperation 
with China, CEE countries should work and act together. Regular 17+0 consultation 
meetings – where economic interests and intentions should be gathered – should 
precede 17+1 summits. Moreover, monitoring and evaluation meetings could follow 
the annual summits, where the representatives of the 17 CEE countries can share 
their experience, reservations and plans on how to proceed.
The major challenges of trade relations, such as trade deficit, cannot be overcome 
by single country solutions; CEE countries shoud follow the EU’s strategic aims in 
trade policy. Since a significant portion of CEE’s exports to China is connected to – 
mainly Western European – multinational companies based in CEE, local decisions 
may have less, or even no effect.
Coordinated rules should be established relating to investment screening also 
in non-EU member states. 
When it comes to non-EU countries’ recent rapprochement with China, the 
EU’s responsibility is undeniable: it must play a more active role in these countries’ 
economic development, enhancing their engagement with the EU and providing 
a credible enlargement perspective.
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3. We the people? The challenges 
of societal relations with China
Alicja Bachulska, Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova and Nina Pejić
Although the societal181 level of cooperation between China and Central and East-
ern Europe has been perceived as relatively uncontroversial, given the nature of the 
Chinese regime and the penetration of the society by the party-state apparatus, this 
particular type of “people-to-people” cooperation should to a large extent be rather 
considered “government-to-people”. This element has to be taken into account when 
assessing possible future implications for tightening ties with China at this level.
The first issue that most probably comes to one’s mind when thinking about this 
area of cooperation between China and CEE countries are the Confucius Institutes 
(CIs).182 CIs’ official aim is the promotion of Chinese language and culture abroad. 
Confucius Institutes differ from other national institutions of this kind (such as 
Alliance Française, Goethe Institute or British Council) in the way they operate 
institutionally – they are established through bilateral cooperation with local uni-
versities, thus becoming part of their internal structures. CIs are managed by Hanban 
(Confucius Institute Headquarters), a nominally non-profit organization that reports 
to the Chinese Ministry of Education – a type of setup that enables CIs to cooperate 
with foreign universities while maintaining an image of relative independence from 
the Chinese government.183
The development of CIs in Central and Eastern Europe seems to run in parallel 
to the 17+1 initiative as some of the institutes were opened before the inception 
of the platform. In the V4 region it dates back to the 2000s, with the first two CIs 
opened in Krakow, Poland and Budapest, Hungary in 2006. As of late 2019, there 
were six CIs in Poland, two in Czechia, three in Slovakia and five in Hungary. Thus, 
V4 hosts 16 CIs in total. Additionally, several Confucius Classrooms (CCs) operate 
at a number of universities within the V4 with the potential to expand to full-scale 
CIs. Some of them focus on specific areas of cooperation that are not purely education 
or culture-related, such as the promotion of traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) at 
Slovak Medical University or at University of Pecs in Hungary.184 In comparison, CIs 
in the Baltics opened relatively late – in 2010, in Vilnius, Lithuania, and in Tallinn, 
Estonia, then in Riga, Latvia, in 2011. No additional CIs have been established since, 
reportedly due to the small size of the countries, but a network of CCs has expanded 
to include other universities and middle schools both in the capitals and beyond. 
When it comes to the Balkans, initially there were only a few CIs established in the 
region (e.g. in Sofia, Bulgaria in 2005; Belgrade, Serbia in 2006 or Sibiu, Romania in 
2006). Coinciding with China’s newfound interest in the region, fifteen more opened 
in the Balkans: in Slovenia (Ljubljana, 2009), Bulgaria (Veliko Turnovo, 2012), Albania 
(Tirana, 2013), Romania (Cluj-Napoca, 2009; Brasov, 2011 and Bucharest, 2013), Serbia 
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(Novi Sad, 2013), Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sarajevo, 2014 and Banja Luka – capital of 
Republika Srpska – in 2017), North Macedonia (Skopje, 2013), Croatia (Zagreb, 2013), 
Montenegro (Podgorica, 2014) and Greece (Athens, 2008, Thessaloniki, 2018, Thessaly, 
2019). Altogether 18 CIs function in the Balkans. 
As of late 2019, altogether 37 Confucius Institutes were operating in Central and 
Eastern Europe. According to the Hanban website which lists all operating CIs, there 
are in total 184 institutions of this kind in Europe.185 The UK seems to be the leader 
with 30 CIs and 3 CCs, while other major European players also host more CIs than 
any CEE state. For example, Germany has 19 CIs (the same as Russia), France 18 and 
Italy 12. In terms of mere numbers, CEECs are more comparable to countries like 
Sweden (2 CIs), Denmark (2 CIs) or Portugal (5 CIs). Despite their development, the 
number of CIs in CEE remains rather modest. It is also hard to establish any causal 
link between their establishment and precise advancements of the 17+1 framework. It 
rather seems that CIs have been established based on bilateral negotiations between 
given universities.
The role of CIs within the 17+1 format has remained surprisingly limited. The 
only document that mentions CIs as part of the 17+1 framework was China’s Twelve 
Measures for Promoting Friendly Cooperation with Central and Eastern European 
Countries.186 The document’s ninth measure concerns cooperation in the area of edu-
cation, where China promised to “support the Confucius Institutes and Confucius 
Classrooms program in the 16 countries and invite 1,000 students from relevant 
countries to study the Chinese language in China in the next five years”. China also 
pledged to “[e]nhance inter-university exchanges and joint academic research, and send 
1,000 students and scholars to the 16 countries in the next five years”.187 Guidelines 
have entirely omitted the topic of CIs. One can only speculate what the reasons for 
this omission were: anticipation of the institutes’ controversial nature and related 
problems or a more mundane decision to leave them aside for other managerial or ad-
ministrative reasons. Either way, CIs seem to be largely left out of the 17+1 framework. 
Other less visible activities include academic cooperation between universities 
through multilateral frameworks related to 17+1, such as the China-CEECs Higher 
Education Institutions Consortium that brings together 134 institutions from  China 
and the CEE region.188 Among them, there are four academic institutions from 
V4 countries: two from Poland (Białystok University of Technology and SWPS Uni-
versity of Social Sciences and Humanities) and two from Czechia (Technical University 
of Liberec and Tomáš Baťa University in Zlín). Slovakia and Hungary do not have any 
members within the consortium. There is also the Alliance of Silk Road Business 
Schools with V4 academic institutions from Czechia and Slovakia.189 It seems that 
educational cooperation between the most prestigious universities in V4 countries 
and China takes place bilaterally outside of these kinds of networks. 
As with V4 universities, universities in the Baltic states have also joined the 
China-CEECs Higher Education Institutions Consortium. Lithuania has been the 
most active, with four universities as members, including the Vilnius Gediminas 
Technical University190, which joined the Consortium already during its inaugural 
meeting in 2013. The interest of Lithuanian universities has not diminished, with two 
universities joining in 2016 and one applying for membership in 2018. Estonia’s only 
member – the Academy of Arts – joined the consortium during the first meeting as 
Em
pt
y 
sh
el
l n
o 
m
or
e:
 C
hi
na
’s
 g
ro
w
in
g 
fo
ot
pr
in
t i
n 
C
en
tr
al
 a
nd
 E
as
te
rn
 E
ur
op
e
59
MAP 3: CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES IN THE 17 CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN 
COUNTRIES
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well, but no institutions have applied since, signaling a loss of interest. Latvia also 
has only one member in the consortium – Riga Technical University – which joined 
relatively late, during the fourth meeting in 2017.191 Notably, the biggest national 
universities – University of Tartu of Estonia, Vilnius University of Lithuania, and 
the University of Latvia – have not acceded to the consortium, even though two of 
them (Vilnius University, University of Latvia) are homes to Confucius Institutes. 
When it comes to the Balkans, local universities have also joined the consortium, 
though many of them only recently (e.g. Albanian University of Shkodra and Univer-
sity of Tirana; University of Banja Luka and University of East Sarajevo in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina or Romanian University of Bucharest and University of Pitesti – all of 
them joined the consortium in 2019). Representatives of some academic institutions 
from other Balkan states joined the initiative as early as 2013, like Bulgaria (Sofia 
University St. Kliment Ohridski, University of Ruse), Croatia (University of Zadar) or 
Montenegro (University of Donja Gorica). So far, Romania and Serbia have been the 
most active among Balkan countries in this format, with the former having eight 
representatives and the latter four.
Interestingly, while some universities joined the consortium, others either pre-
fer bilateral cooperation or other formats of cooperation with Chinese universities. 
The most recent Sino-Baltic documents that regulate cooperation in education and 
science192 do not mention 17+1 or BRI cooperation at all – they are purely bilateral, 
with ASEM, UNESCO and EU programs on education as the only references to su-
pranational frameworks.193 It might be the case that the most prestigious universities 
in CEE have both the capabilities and the resources to establish bilateral forms of 
cooperation, while smaller and less well-known ones perceive their participation in 
China-led initiatives as a chance to internationalize and build global networks in the 
absence of other high-profile foreign partners, especially from Western academia. It 
should also be noted a general heightening of Central and Eastern European interest 
in China has spilled over into Chinese higher education institutions as well.194
Limited cooperation has also happened under the BRI umbrella195, further blurring 
the lines of what is the main defining framework for cooperation between CEECs 
and China. Given the fragmented nature of cooperation in the field more in-depth 
analysis of specific cases is needed. 
Similarly to developments in Australia, the US and Canada, Europe has also started 
to look with suspicion on cooperation with Chinese academia and Chinese embassies’ 
involvement in some of the projects. The first precedent of how China yielded its 
influence in European academia can be revealed via an audit of the Czech-Chinese 
Center at Charles University in Czechia. In October 2019, Czech media uncovered that 
the Chinese embassy covertly funded events as well as an entire university course on 
the benefits of the BRI through a private business established by several em ployees 
of the Czech-Chinese Center.196 As a result of the scandal, the center was closed 
down. Another institution related to knowledge exchange, which has had suspicions 
raised about its agenda, is the China-CEE Institute established in Budapest by the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS, a top-level national research organization 
based in Beijing). The Hungarian Academy of Sciences was reluctant to establish the 
institute as a joint-venture between the two academies. The joint- venture format, 
initially suggested by the Chinese side, raised some suspicions regarding the scope of 
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the institute’s work and planned activities. Finally, it was established as a non-profit 
organization by CASS only. Despite the Hungarian Academy of Sciences’ hesitation 
regarding close cooperation with the Chinese side, the country at large has maintained 
its enthusiasm when it comes to nurturing cooperation with Chinese entities in the 
fields of science, research and education.197
The Hungarian case is, however, not the only one. Several countries in the Balkans 
have established local non-governmental organizations that work on establishing 
soft-power relations with China, e.g. The Association of Bosnia-China Friendship, 
the Chinese-Montenegrin Friendship Society, the Society of Slovenian-Chinese 
Friendship. Their activities are mostly related to exchanges, guest lectures, celebra-
tions of Chinese public holidays and mutual visits.198 They do not seem to have a big 
influence on the local environment as they seem to function as gathering places for 
people who are interested in Chinese culture or China as a travel destination. So far, 
they seem to function with little institutional support from local governments and 
have limited visibility. 
Another specific case is the China-CEECs High-Level Symposium of Think 
Tanks, a regular event hosted annually since 2013 in either China or CEE countries. 
According to the Chinese side, the symposia represent “the largest high-level academ-
ic exchange so far between China and the CEECs” and are supposed to function as 
platforms for knowledge exchange among experts, former diplomats and academics 
from China and CEE.199 The majority of conferences have been advertised through 
an open calls for papers, indicating that participants whose papers are accepted will 
receive full funding to join the event (including international travel expenses and 
accommodation).200 However, as some evidence from the Balkan region suggests201, 
the organizational and logistical burden (such as venue, catering or transportation of 
guests) have been disproportionately placed on local Ministries of Foreign Affairs, 
while the overall agenda, confirmation of participants as well as the actual content 
of the meetings has been largely influenced by the Chinese side. 
Unlike countries in the V4 and the Baltics, one specific aspect of cooperation be-
tween China and the Balkans deserves international attention, as it points towards 
Beijing’s new area of interest, namely a recent focus on cooperation in innovation and 
applied science.202 The third 17+1 Conference on Innovation Cooperation was held in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in October 2018.203 Interestingly, at the conference Huawei 
signed cooperation documents with the Ministry of Communications and Trans-
port of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Sarajevo Municipal Government, leading to 
the conclusion that conferences in the field of scientific cooperation might actually 
include business delegations from the Chinese side. Furthermore, in the Dubrovnik 
Guidelines, Croatia took the initiative of establishing the China-CEECs Information 
and Communication Technology Coordination Mechanism, which supports knowl-
edge exchange in high-tech industrial parks incubators, innovative start-ups, etc. 
In 2020 Slovenia will host the fifth China-CEECs Cultural and Creative Industries 
Forum. This can be taken as a case study on how some CEE countries host these 
events: The Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs organized the Slovenia Creative 
Forum in 2018 and 2019 in an effort to gather the representatives of creative indus-
tries from Slovenia and the region. This year the forum will be organized again, but it 
will be re-branded as part of the 17+1 initiative, possibly due to financial constraints. 
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Montenegro expressed its desire to host China-CEECs’ Creative Hub to serve as an 
art residency platform with the goal of supporting the exchange of artistic creative 
potential, creative goods and objects, however, it has not yet been implemented since 
the Dubrovnik summit. Given the lack of resources to invest in and develop the field 
of creative industries, especially stark in the Balkan region, Beijing’s move towards 
this area of cooperation clearly represents a soft power strategy. As China in recent 
years has significantly accelerated its own domestic development of state-supported 
creative industries, it is also trying to position itself as an international pioneer in the 
field (e.g. in architecture, marketing and advertising, media and publishing).
Beyond Confucius Institutes and academic exchange, the scope of cultural co-
operation between China and CEE is rather broad, ranging from art, film, theater, 
opera and dance cooperation, to contacts between publishing industries, to even 
rather marginal issues such as library cooperation (e.g. China-CEECs’ Libraries Union 
Initiative204). In general, cultural cooperation with China has been seen in all CEE 
countries as the least controversial, despite its potential for generating tensions. In 
V4 countries, participants from the region have attended biannual cultural forums 
organized through the 17+1 platform from its very beginning (Beijing, 2013, Sofia, 
2015, and Hangzhou, 2017). However, while a number of events have been held, the 
media in Visegrád countries have shown little interest in reporting on the events.205 
Cooperation related to heritage preservation has also been on the rise, with 
events like the China-CEECs’ Experts Forum on Intangible Cultural Heritage (held in 
Kraków in 2016206). Other events included visits by various Chinese delegations. For 
example, a Chinese Performing Arts delegation visited Poland and Czechia in 2014, 
Hungary in 2015 and Slovakia in 2016 in order to commission performances back in 
China. Moreover, the 1st China-CEECs’ Literature Forum was held in Budapest in 
2016 and martial arts training sessions were organized in both Hungary and Poland. 
From the perspective of the Baltic states, culture has been the most active and 
least problematic of all aspects of Sino-Baltic relations. The Belgrade Guidelines (2014) 
presented a regional rather than a cultural approach towards exchanges with each 
country involved, stating that the Chinese side is ready to “use the opportunity of the 
Festival of Baltic Culture to gradually improve its model of cultural exchanges with 
CEECs,” and to “hold a Chinese art festival in the three Baltic countries in 2015.”207 The 
Chinese Art Festival of 2015 is mentioned as one of the official format outcomes208, 
most probably referring to several separate China-organized events that took place 
in the Baltic capitals throughout 2015. Cultural exchanges have mainly taken place 
through existing institutions, however, in some cases new institutions have also 
been established. In November 2019, the only China Culture Centre (CCC) in the 
Baltic states was formally launched in Riga, Latvia during the visit of the Minister 
of Culture and Tourism Luo Shugang on the sidelines of the 17+1 Forum on Tourism 
cooperation. The founding of the center had been an initiative of the Chinese side from 
2015-2016. Having had several soft launches in 2018, prior to the ministerial visit big 
opening, the CCC does not seem to be part of a strong, pre-planned strategy, but an 
illustration of China’s inventive approach to institution-building, already observed in 
other sectors. It seems that the following logic has been applied by the Chinese side: 
first, establish the framework, then see how much substance it attracts, and, finally, 
enhance or downsize the framework depending on the previous results. Since the 
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CCC is curated by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (unlike the CIs, curated by 
Hanban and ultimately the Ministry of Education), there are grounds to assume that 
the CCC will take over some of the CIs’ culture promotion functions and will serve 
as a testing ground for a new institutionalized form of Chinese culture promotion, 
established in order to tune down the controversies surrounding CIs. 
In terms of bilateral agreements signed at the level of the 17+1 framework, during 
the third China-CEECs’ Cultural Cooperation forum in Hangzhou (2017), Latvia 
signed an intergovernmental cooperation agreement on cooperation in culture with 
China, being the last of the Baltic states to do so. The document covers cooperation 
in the fields of tangible and intangible cultural heritage, museums, visual and applied 
arts, music and performing arts, libraries, literature and translation, cinema and oth-
er fields.209 At the same event, Estonia signed the latest addition to its pre-existing 
agreement, namely, the Cooperation Program of the Estonian and Chinese Cultural 
Ministries for 2018 to 2022. The program mainly speaks of bilateral exchanges, while 
17+1 and BRI are addressed only towards the end of the document.210 For Lithuania, the 
most recent document that regulates cultural cooperation with China is the Program 
of Bilateral Cultural Cooperation for 2017–2021.211 The introductory clause of the pro-
gram makes reference to the China-CEE Sofia Declaration on Cultural Cooperation, 
shaping Sino-Lithuanian cooperation along the lines of 17+1 exchanges, leading to 
the conclusion that in the Baltics the official BRI and 17+1 narrative is more visible in 
cultural cooperation than in education and science. For example, a multitude of Silk 
Road-themed exhibitions212 and concerts have taken place in Lithuania, Latvia, and 
Estonia, referring both to China-CEE and BRI cooperation. The two-way cultural 
exchanges between China and the Baltic states have indeed increased significantly, 
and Chinese counterparts have been providing top venues for showcasing Baltic 
culture, including contemporary art exhibitions,213 theater shows, literature festivals 
(including subsequent translations and publications), classical, choral and folk music. 
As far as cultural cooperation between China and the Balkans is concerned, it 
has taken a variety of formats. North Macedonia was chosen as a sectorial coordi-
nator for culture (at the Sofia summit in 2018), and Skopje was selected to host the 
Center for Coordination of Cultural Cooperation of the 17+1. However, months after 
its establishment, the center remains largely inactive and unknown to the expert 
public. In Montenegro, China has been building its new embassy since late 2018, 
which has added facilities for cultural exhibitions.214 In Serbia, the Chinese Cultural 
Center (CCC) was inaugurated during Xi’s visit to Belgrade in June 2016. It was the 
first venue of its kind in the Balkans. Its location coincides with the location of the 
former Chinese embassy bombed in 1999 by NATO. The project – which is to be 
implemented by a Chinese company215 – will supposedly cost 45 million USD and 
is supposed to host a cinema, a theater, a library of Chinese books and various edu-
cational facilities.216 A Chinese Cultural Center was also opened in 2017 in Sofia, 
Bulgaria. The establishment became the largest Chinese cultural center in the CEE 
region, as it covers eight floors with a total area of 4,000 m2. Similarly to the Baltic 
states, cultural promotion is likely to be conducted via the CCCs, however, their 
opening has been covered by the press much more than the openings of CIs in the 
region, especially in Serbia. Serbia also co-hosted the first China-CEECs Cultural 
Heritage Forum in 2017217, which resulted in China helping a Serbian town apply 
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for UNESCO heritage listing. Reportedly, several academic exchanges in regard to 
cultural heritage also took place following the event.218 Some Balkan states (Slovenia, 
Croatia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, Albania, Serbia, Romania) also financially support the 
China-CEECs’ Music Academies’ Union, founded in 2017 to promote cooperation in 
music, drama and dance with the support of local ministries of culture.219 
It seems difficult to assess whether the existing frameworks for cooperation have 
brought about any long-term and tangible connections that will be sustained over time 
and across regions. The multitude of seemingly high-level frameworks for coopera-
tion associated with the 17+1 initiative, BRI as well as bilateral cooperation does not 
mean that their existence translates directly into achieving long-term goals on both 
sides. Also, the quality of output generated through these frameworks would have to 
be analyzed in order to assess their value. However, as cooperation in culture is the 
least politically abrasive, it does not require exclusivity and its delivery is relatively 
easy, it can be expected to become a leading success story of China-CEE cooperation, 
especially in the absence of the most anticipated results in the economic domain.
DON’T TRUST ANYONE UNDER THIRTY:  
YOUTH COOPERATION AND ITS PERILS 
Similarly to cultural cooperation, youth cooperation between CEE and China has 
been on the rise and seems to be linked to the establishment of the 17+1 initiative. Two 
specific programs deserve closer attention: Bridge for the Future and China-CEECs’ 
Young Political Leaders’ Forum. The former is a program targeting youth leaders from 
different regions of the world, who travel to China to visit different enterprises and 
organizations and attend events (in 2019 participants from CEE attended the BRI 
International Forum for Young Innovators). According to scarce media reports,220 
Bridge for the Future has been coordinated and sponsored by All-China Youth Fede-
ration (ACYF), a body bringing together 16 national organizations with the Com-
munist Youth League of China at its core as well as 36 provincial level organizations 
that work directly under the central government and the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China (CCP).221 One of the official goals of the ACYF is to “hold 
high the banner of patriotism and socialism, to unite and educate young people from 
all walks of life and to encourage young people to learn Marxism-Leninism”.222 The 
nature of this organization, which falls under the United Front Work Department, 
is highly political and serves the needs of expanding the CCP’s outreach. Thus, it 
seems legitimate to assume that Bridge for the Future would have similar goals. 
Moreover, the same program was an element of the previously mentioned scandal 
at the Czech-Chinese Center at Charles University in Prague. Some of the students 
who attended the course on the BRI, sponsored by the Chinese embassy, were later 
chosen to participate in Bridge for the Future.223 It seems that their admission to the 
program happened on a rather arbitrary basis. When it comes to China-CEECs’ Young 
Political Leaders’ Forum, it has been organized by the International Department of 
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China as well as All-China Youth 
Federation.224 The former is an agency reporting directly to the Central Committee 
of the CCP and serving as an informal channel of communication with outside 
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 partners, through which Beijing promotes its perspective and seeks to foster ties with 
influential individuals from different regions.225 One of the most prominent goals of 
the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
of China is also to further Beijing’s long-term interests by maintaining friendly ties 
with rising foreign politicians and influencers who it is believed will hold positions 
of power in the future.226
Given the rather suspicious character of both programs, it is rather striking that 
both frameworks have been close to non-existent in local media’s coverage in CEE. 
The information from the Baltic states shows that recruitment has been conducted 
via political parties’ channels: invitations have been sent out to the leading political 
parties and their affiliated bodies in each country and not to the respective embassies. 
From Latvia, the youth organization Restart.lv of the Social Democratic party Saskaņa 
(traditionally associated with the Russian electorate) seems the most active in this 
respect.227 In Lithuania, information about the events has been disseminated through 
the Confucius Institute of Vilnius University which has been posting invitations to 
youth to take part in the initiatives.228 The interest in participation seems generally 
low. Lack of transparency and limited information especially on the Young Political 
Leaders’ Forum should cause concerns given the political nature of the target group 
who are supposed to participate in the events as well as the political agenda of the 
bodies responsible for organizing these events on the Chinese side. 
One of the most prominent aspects of cooperation which has contributed to 
building a more positive image of China in CEE is an increase in opportunities to 
travel to China for the youth. Different types of Chinese government scholarships 
have been issued to students from the region, ranging from Confucius scholarships 
(issued by CIs and focused on language training) to differently funded undergraduate 
and postgraduate programs, taught both in English and Mandarin. Representatives 
from V4, Balkan as well as Baltic states have joined the most prestigious Chinese 
international postgraduate programs (like the Yenching Academy of Peking Univer-
sity), which boost China’s soft power and an image of the country as a place offering 
academic excellence for the chosen few. While initially relatively uncontroversial, 
recently, even this type of cooperation has attracted criticism. Given increasingly 
restricted academic freedom at most Chinese universities, there have been fears of 
Chinese government scholarships forming a new generation of China-minded indi-
viduals who might not be able to critically assess Beijing’s behavior. While this line 
of criticism seems exaggerated, nurturing a China-friendly cohort from different 
world regions does seem to be one of the aims of these kinds of scholarship programs. 
Yet, assessing the impact of receiving education in China depends on the individual 
circumstances of each student and it remains problematic to generalize about the 
impact of studying abroad in China on CEE students. 
Even though the year 2019 was declared the China-CEECs Education and Youth 
 Exchange Year, regional actors have not been particularly active in this regard. Specifi-
cally in the Baltic states, Latvia reported “around 250 Latvian students studying in China 
during the course of several years”, and similar numbers have been found for Lithuania 
(lower for Estonia).229 Baltic representatives have taken part in Bridge for the Future 
camps, but no proactive involvement or active institutional cooperation has taken place. 
Moreover, some company-specific projects were framed as being part of the 
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17+1 framework. For example, during the China-CEE Economic and Trade Forum on 
the sidelines of the Dubrovnik Summit (2019), Huawei announced the launch of the 
One Thousand Dreams social contribution program that aims “to improve the digital 
skills of the youth in CEE countries”230 – it is too early to provide a prognosis of the 
outcome of this initiative, but there are grounds to assume it will not gain traction 
in the Baltic and V4 countries both due to the relatively high digital literacy among 
the youth as well as the growing EU-wide controversies surrounding Huawei and its 
links to the Chinese state. It is also worth noting that Huawei has actively promoted 
its global Seeds for the Future program in CEE – an initiative aimed at providing both 
technical training as well as an introduction to the Chinese language and culture 
to the best students from technological universities worldwide by sending them to 
Huawei’s headquarters in Shenzhen for an all-expenses-paid trip. 
As far as the Balkan states are concerned, youth cooperation had not been a sig-
nificant part of the previous 17+1 summits. However, at the Dubrovnik summit, it 
was decided that Albania would establish the China–CEECs Youth Development 
Centre, which will “enhance mutual understanding between youths of China and 
CEECs”.231 Slovenia and Croatia as EU members participated in the first Belt and Road 
EU Young Leaders’ Visit Program to China in September 2019 in collaboration with 
the Austrian government, which identified young leaders from academia, business, 
politics, the media and civil society.232 The visit was organized by the CI at the Univer-
sity of Graz and invitations were distributed through academic and business circles 
to relevant recipients in Slovenia and Croatia. The unusual organizational setup of 
the meeting raises questions about the motivations behind such a move, especially 
in the context of the program’s official motivations, such as the assumption that “EU 
Young Leaders treasure to learn and understand China’s splendid culture and the 
miracle of its reform and opening up policy”, as the official brochure indicates.233 The 
initiative seems to follow the same logic as other China-initiated programs of this 
kind: an event aimed at nurturing a China-friendly cohort among youth elites from 
respective foreign countries.
COLLECTIVE SPORTS? SUPPORT FOR CHINA BEFORE THE 2022 OLYMPICS
Apart from academic, cultural and youth cooperation, sports constitute another 
part of the contacts between CEE and China under the 17+1 framework. The issue 
might seem rather marginal, yet its importance has risen in light of China’s prepara-
tion for the Winter Olympic Games in 2022. Sports cooperation was first mentioned 
in the 2015 Medium-Term Agenda for Cooperation issued during the Suzhou sum-
mit. However, the mention was extremely vague and stated that “the participants 
welcome exchanges and cooperation in the field of sports”.234 Two years later, the 
Budapest Guidelines listed some specific areas of cooperation to be established, such 
as “joint training camps, seminars, short and long term exchanges of coaches, shar-
ing best practices in management as well as exploring possibilities of cooperation 
in the construction of sport facilities”.235 Martial arts were also mentioned as having 
the potential to be promoted in CEECs. The same guidelines also stated for the first 
time that sports cooperation should be centered around winter sports. The topic was 
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subsequently raised in the 2018 Sofia Guidelines as well as in the 2019 Dubrovnik 
Guidelines. Especially in the case of the latter, the focus on Winter Olympics-related 
cooperation was evident. However, simultaneously, the stress was on enhancing bi-
lateral cooperation between respective organizations at the national and local levels, 
instead of creating new multilateral formats.236 Although the Dubrovnik Guidelines 
mention the establishment of the China-CEECs Coordination Mechanism for Sports 
in CEE countries, it seems that no large-scale events or projects have been organized 
so far at the level of all 17 states. Yet again, it seems that the 17+1 framework serves as 
a tool for communicating bilateral needs and expectations rather than coordinating 
joint efforts among actors involved. 
As with many other issues connected to China in the V4 region, sports-related 
investment has also become a topic of controversy, as when Czech Slavia Prague 
football club was saved from bankruptcy in 2015 by CEFC Europe, a Chinese private 
company that at the time invested heavily in Czechia. CEFC’s chairman Ye Jianming, 
who also served as the Czech president’s advisor, was detained in China under unclear 
allegations. This has initiated a period of uncertainty for all CEFC-related invest-
ment in Czechia, followed by a public debate reassessing Prague’s pro-Beijing policy 
under president Zeman and further polarizing Czech public opinion when it comes 
to the preferred level of political interaction and economic exchange with Beijing.237 
However, the type of investment exemplified by the Slavia Prague case falls outside 
of the official scope of the 17+1 framework. Instead, it points towards a larger trend 
in which China (or rather Chinese individuals or enterprises, also state-owned) 
invests in foreign sports clubs for specific reasons (e.g. marketing of their own prod-
ucts, expansion in the European market). In the case of Slavia Prague, it was more 
about personal connections between people involved in the investment and their 
broader motives (e.g. further access to more strategic sectors in the Czech market, 
proving the trustworthiness of CEFC as an investor and improving CEFC’s PR), 
than about any special interest in Slavia Prague as such.238 When CEFC itself went 
bankrupt, the state-owned CITIC took over the asset and later on sold it to a new 
owner  Sinobo. Czech sportsmen have also worked as sports ambassadors in China: 
the football player Pavel Nedvěd replaced David Beckham as the face of the Chinese 
Super League239, while sporting veteran and former superstar Jaromír Jágr (who has 
also been advertising Huawei products in Czechia) started to cooperate with the 
Chinese Ice Hockey Association.240 The latter has also agreed to become the face of 
the Beijing 2022 Winter Olympic Games Hockey Tournament.241 
None of the Baltic states has been mentioned in relation to cooperation in sports 
in official 17+1 documents, however, the topic has come up on the agenda of Chi-
na-CEECs meetings, including at the Riga Summit (2016). Given the upcoming Beijing 
Winter Olympics, the Chinese side has expressed an interest in Latvia’s experience 
in luge, bobsleigh and skeleton,242 both in regard to athlete training and track en-
gineering.243 An MoU on Sports Cooperation between the Ministry of Education 
and Science of Latvia and the General Administration of Sport of the PRC244 was 
negotiated in part also during the 17+1 events and signed in 2018, but the text of the 
memorandum bears no mention of the framework as such, yet again making it hard to 
distinguish between bilateral cooperation, the 17+1 format and BRI. Moreover, several 
Baltic coaches and players have been pursuing their careers in China in sports such 
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as basketball, football and ice hockey.245 This type of cooperation, however, seems to 
bear no relation to the political initiatives. As of 2019, no acquisitions of sports clubs 
by China in the Baltics have taken place. However, a sponsorship contract between 
the Sūduva football club in Marijampole, Lithuania, and the partially state-owned 
Chinese surveillance equipment production giant Hangzhou Hikvision has sparked 
controversies in the country246, as the company has been blacklisted by the US since 
late 2019 for its role in the surveillance and mass detention of the Uighur ethnic 
minority in the PRC.247
As for the Balkan states, dance and winter sports seem to be the only elements of 
sports-related cooperation between China and the region within the 17+1 framework. 
Events that have taken place include the 4th Dance Summer Camp held in Croatia in 
August 2018 and the annual meeting of the Dance Culture Alliance held in Belgrade, 
Serbia, in April 2019. Slovenia has reportedly planned to include its ski-jumping 
traditions into the framework; however, this has not yet been incorporated in the 
guidelines. 
NATURAL REMEDY? THE CURIOUS CASE OF TRADITIONAL  
CHINESE MEDICINE AS AN EXPORT COMMODITY 
The promotion of Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) has been quite high on 
the official agenda of the 17+1 framework. As mentioned before, two CI-related 
institutions are preoccupied with the promotion of TCM: one in Slovakia (Slovak 
Medical University) and one in Hungary (University of Pecs). However, due to legal 
constraints, TCM remains at the margin of mainstream health practices in Europe. 
Despite that, the Chinese side keeps promoting TCM as part of China’s traditional 
culture and heritage. When it comes to V4 countries, China-CEECs Association of 
Traditional Chinese Medicine was set up in Budapest in March 2017, including local 
TCM organizations from Hungary, Poland, Romania, Czechia, Latvia and Slovenia.248 
The institution was established in Hungary most probably because since 2015 TCM 
has been legally recognized there as a medical practice. In other V4 countries, TCM 
has been treated as either a paramedical or a therapeutic activity. In Czechia, there 
has been a debate in the parliament about promoting TCM249. The promotion of TCM 
in the Czech Republic has been linked to the previously mentioned CEFC, which 
sponsored the first TCM center at a hospital in Hradec Králové. However, due to 
CEFC’s financial problems and Ye Jianming’s detention in China, the center was closed 
down, while the hospital decided to create a special fund in order to keep providing 
TCM services. This type of situation has been enabled due to the fact that the practice 
of TCM in V4 countries has remained largely unregulated, with local organizations 
usually stating that in the absence of domestic regulations, World Health Organization 
(WHO) rules should be applied.250
Interestingly, according to the official 17+1 documents, cooperation between local 
health ministries and their Chinese counterparts has been categorized as people- to-
people cooperation, not as the cooperation among governments, as it includes mem-
bers of administrations on all sides. The first China-CEECs’ Health Ministers’ Forum 
was held in Prague in June 2015 and its outcomes included the Prague Declaration 
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on health cooperation and development.251 The declaration was broad and touched 
upon issues including an increased need to develop communication, e.g. related to 
infectious disease monitoring. During the second China-CEECs’ Health Ministers’ 
Forum held in Suzhou in 2016, China issued the Suzhou Joint Communiqué, and 
announced the establishment of the China-CEECs’ Association on the Promotion 
of Health Cooperation, the China-CEECs’ Hospital Cooperation Alliance and the 
China- CEECs’ Public Health Cooperation Mechanism. The third China-CEECs’ 
Health Ministers’ Forum was held in Budapest, Hungary in June 2017. 
Although Lithuania’s “exploration in the field of traditional Chinese medicine” 
was mentioned in the Sofia Guidelines (2018), none of the Baltic states has been the 
driving force of China-CEE cooperation in TCM. Legal limitations persist regard-
ing the registration of TCM pharmaceuticals and methods of treatment. The main 
interest in China-CEE health cooperation for the Baltics is, yet again, an economic 
one – drawing investments in life sciences, attracting Chinese students to study in 
the region’s medical schools, and medical tourism promotion.
Similarly, in the Balkans there have been very few developments in health co-
operation. One of the few events was the first China-CEECs Qigong Health Forum, 
which was held in Serbia in October 2018, while the Health Qigong Team visited 
Slovenia and Serbia for training sessions and promotional purposes in 2016. In terms 
of medicine cooperation, a TCM Center was planned to open at the VMA (Military 
Hospital Centre) in Serbia by the end of 2019, with the Chinese side donating the 
equipment and the military hospital equipping the rooms. Following the visit of 
a medical delegation of the People’s Liberation Army, it was confirmed that the new 
center would be managed by Serbian specialists who have been trained to practice 
TCM in the past few years, while Chinese medical professionals would monitor their 
work.252 Bulgaria also hosts several TCM centers, while Romania hosted the First 
International Conference on Traditional Chinese Medicine in 2019.253
THE FOURTH ESTATE AND A NEW GLOBAL POWER:  
TELLING THE CHINA STORY
While it is difficult to dissect whether media cooperation is a result of the 
17+1 framework or a specific bilateral or even unilateral (coming from the local 
Chinese embassy) action, China has undoubtedly been increasingly active in pro-
moting its image in Central and Eastern Europe. Methods applied by the Chinese 
side include placing ambassadors’ op-eds to local media outlets, inviting journalists 
to China, publishing sponsored articles or even placing whole supplements to local 
media, cooperation with local PR companies or investing in media outlets254. The last 
strategy seems very effective, as the project ChinfluenCE, which mapped reporting 
related to China in the V4 region, discovered with findings that Chinese investment 
into Czech media outlets resulted in exclusively positive reporting on China in the 
acquired media.255
2017 was officially branded as the Year of China-CEECs Media Cooperation. 
Delegations of journalists from the region visited China and vice-versa. Bilateral 
and multilateral events were organized, resulting in agreements signed between 
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local broadcasters and their Chinese counterparts. For example, the Polish state-
owned broadcaster TVP signed a number of agreements with local Chinese media 
conglomerates, TV stations as well as radio stations, including Hubei Media Group256 
and Chengdu Radio and Television257. The latter agreement included co-production 
of a documentary about the importance of the BRI for Sino-Polish connectivity and 
relations between the cities of Łódź and Chengdu. Moreover, Polish Press Agency 
(PAP) and Poland-Asia Studies Center (CSPA) have signed an agreement with China 
Economic Information Service, a body affiliated with Xinhua News Agency.258  Op-eds 
by the PRC representatives as well as sponsored content related to the promotion 
of China has also appeared in the Polish media, most notably in a popular centrist 
daily Rzeczpospolita.
Event-specific media cooperation has also been recorded in the region. In Czechia, 
the Chinese Embassy sponsored an eight-page long supplement promoting the 70th 
anniversary of establishing diplomatic ties between Beijing and Prague, published 
in a nation-wide daily, Právo. The section was obscurely labeled as a “theme and 
commercial supplement.”259 The coverage was exclusively positive, while the whole 
content was attributed to the daily’s reporters, possibly leading readers to the con-
clusion that the supplement was the usual reporting of the paper.260 Apart from the 
nation-wide daily Právo, other supplements occurred in Literární Noviny (the news-
paper used to be famous particularly during the Prague Spring of 1968, however, it is 
rather marginal now).261 In Slovakia, the marginal leftist internet portal Nové Slovo 
and a disinformation outlet Hlavné Správy have been used as the medium of choice 
for statements and interviews with the Chinese ambassador. However, recently the 
Chinese Embassy cooperated with a mainstream business weekly, Trend, on a special 
edition on China262, and the weekly also published an op-ed of the Chinese ambas-
sador on the Hong Kong protests in the form of an advertorial.263
In the Baltics, no high-level media-related event has taken place. Trips of journal-
ists to China, including Tibet, were organized in 2017 and 2019. Although tracking 
precise bilateral or multilateral media-related agreements with China in the Bal-
tic states seems problematic, several cases of cooperation have been recorded. For 
 example, paid inserts and op-eds by Chinese officials have appeared in media such 
as Neatkarīgā Rīta Avīze (a newspaper of the controversial Latvian oligarch Aivars 
Lembergs, whose assets were recently blocked in the US under the Magnitsky Act 
due to allegations of corruption) as well as on the online news platform Delfi.lv, 
which published a piece by Shen Xiaokai, the Economic and Commercial Counselor 
of the Chinese Embassy in Latvia.264 The latter platform is a strong media player in 
the Baltic region, with separate editions in each state, including a version in Russian. 
As far as the Balkans are concerned, Beijing has established several foreign lan-
guage news outlets in the region. This allows for two activities: for Beijing to reach 
a broader audience, “not only high-profile summits between Chinese leaders and 
their foreign counterparts” but also for coverage of “China’s more under-reported 
activities around the world”.265 Xinhua News Agency is also present in the Balkan 
states, with several Chinese correspondents covering the regional affairs. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina stand out in the area of journalism, due to the Sarajevo Chinese Embas-
sy’s sponsorship of a website “Kina-danas” (“China Daily”)266, in which China-related 
issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina are covered (including economics, politics, culture 
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and sports). They report on the news coming from China, but also on news related 
to the 17+1 framework which is also connected to China (e.g. headlines such as “Xi 
visiting Greece”, “The Minister wants cooperation between Serbia and Huawei to 
enhance”) and BRI news. These outlets do not include original content (such as op-
eds or articles written by local authors) but copy the content from Chinese official 
outlets (such as Xinhua) in local languages.
China Radio International (CRI) also airs in nine local languages (Albanian, 
Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Greek, Hungarian, Polish, Romanian and Serbian), yet 
its audience and reach remain unknown. So far, CRI seems to have limited outreach. 
It was established long before the era of social media and it seems to be working as 
a rather outdated tool of soft power that exists largely because it receives continued 
funding from the Chinese state.
PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC RELATIONS:  
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Regardless of the actor performing the people-to-people exchange, scholars 
consider it a non-neutral form of international cooperation – the form that involves 
a soft/normative power projection in its core. In the case of China, given the nature 
of its regime and the level of penetration of Chinese society by the party-state appa-
ratus, people-to-people actually means Chinese government-to-people in CEE. This 
aspect has to be borne in mind when analyzing any specific framework for societal 
cooperation and its implications on the ground.
Education and culture seem to be the success stories of China-CEE cooperation. 
Both can yield tangible results relatively easily and seem to have visibly changed the 
regional landscape, especially when it comes to the promotion of Chinese language and 
culture. Despite growing international concerns related to their potential deteriorating 
effects on academic freedom, numbers of Confucius Institutes have increased in CEE 
countries. Youth cooperation has also been on the rise, with increased numbers of 
Chinese government scholarships issued to CEE students and other, seemingly po-
litically motivated, exchange programs implemented in the region. Given the absence 
of specific data, these initiatives’ actual impact on the perception of China among the 
local populace needs yet to be further researched. 
Most of the events related to the societal level of cooperation between China 
and CEE countries have remained under-reported and close to non-existent in local 
media coverage. A few, scarce sources  suggest that some forms of cooperation seem 
to be carried forward in a rather non-transparent manner, targeting individuals (for 
example in the non-governmental sector, the media and academia) who seem to 
present an uncritical attitude towards any form of cooperation with Beijing, which 
in itself is a problem. More independent, fact-based media coverage is needed in or-
der to achieve greater transparency and understanding of how societal cooperation 
between China and CEE actors is carried forward.
Because of the asymmetries in size, resources and free access to information, China 
has a considerable advantage over CEE states when it comes to gaining understanding 
of societal dynamics in the region. Overcoming these asymmetries on the side of CEE 
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countries remains an unsolved issue with limited prospects of improvement, given 
the current political climate in the PRC.
Given the relative lack of funding for China studies in CEE, more public (on the 
EU, state, or regional level) as well as private financial support for local academic 
institutions researching the field is needed in order to avoid a situation where Con-
fucius Institutes and other PRC-related institutions become the most influential 
actors producing and disseminating knowledge about Chinese society and culture. 
China watchers from CEE should exchange knowledge and experience with their 
counterparts from the rest of Europe and other parts of the world in order to detect 
potential threats to democratic standards governing the societal level of cooperation 
with Chinese actors outside of the PRC. The China Observers in Central and Eastern 
Europe (CHOICE) can work as an example of best practice and can inspire other – 
region or sector-based – China-oriented platforms. Lack of trust and communication 
is one of the problems that prevents the wider expert community from creating 
a coherent strategy towards these issues.
While some degree of vigilance is recommended, it remains crucial not to equate 
all forms of societal cooperation with China with potential threats. The focus should 
be on achieving transparency as well as maintaining integrity in terms of creating 
a level playing field for cooperation between all actors involved.
CEE countries should be aware of the risks associated with a growing skepticism 
towards China turning into racist attitudes towards the Chinese diaspora, students 
and tourists. In order to avoid the rise of Sinophobia in CEE, clear divisions should 
be drawn between public criticism of government or party-led activities and Chinese 
nationals and their presence in the region.
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Footnotes
1  The publication uses the name of the platform as 17+1 (encompassing Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia). Where a timeframe is observed,  
the term 16+1 (before Greece‘s accession to the format in April 2019) may appear.
2  e.g. “One Belt, One Road (OBOR): China‘s regional integration initiative,” European Parliament 
Briefing, July 2016, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/586608/
EPRS_BRI(2016)586608_EN.pdf; Jan Gaspers, “China’s “16+1” Equals Much Ado About Nothing?,” 
Reconnecting Asia, December 5, 2017, https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/chinas-
161-equals-much-ado-about-nothing/; Jan Gaspers, “Divide and rule,” Berlin Policy Journal, 
March 2, 2018, https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/divide-and-rule/; mentioned in Emilian Kavalski, 
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(Bratislava: CEIAS, 2016).
20  Stuart Lau, “Czech president to skip Beijing summit over China ‘investment letdown’,”  
South China Morning Post, January 13, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/
article/3045917/czech-president-skip-beijing-summit-over-china-investment.
21  Łukasz Sarek, “The “16+1” Initiative and Poland’s Disengagement from China,” Jamestown China 
Brief, February 15, 2019, https://jamestown.org/program/the-161-initiative-and-polands-
disengagement-from-china/.
22  China-CEE Institute, China-CEECs Tourism Coordination Center, China-CEECs Association of 
Traditional Chinese Medicine, CEE Federation of Chinese Medicine Societies and China-CEECs 
Inter-Bank Association.
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